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INTRODUCTION

On its face, tort law is a law of wrongs. The word "tort" means
wrong.' Before tort was identified as a legal category in its own right,
torts were known as "private wrongs." 2 Judicial opinions in modern
tort cases speak of defendants who owe duties to refrain from wrongful conduct. Courts seek to determine whether those duties have
Associate Dean for Research and Professor, Vanderbilt Law School.
Professor and James H. Quinn Chair in Legal Ethics, Fordham University of School
of Law. We wish to thank the participants in the conference on the Morality of Fortune,
held at the University of Southern California in the spring of 2006, and particularly to our
co-panelist Greg Keating and our commentator, Martin Stone. We have also benefited
greatly from workshops at Florida State University College of Law, Fordham University
School of Law, the University of Kentucky College of Law, Michigan Law School, Oxford
University, and Vanderbilt Law School. Finally, thanks to Ronen Avraham, Tom Baker,
Curtis Bridgeman, Jonathan Cardi, Nita Farahany, John Gardner, Abner Greene, Steve
Hetcher, George Letsas, Arthur Ripstein, Peter Schuck, Nicos Stavropoulos, Robert Stevens, Michael Vandenbergh, and Jeremy Waldron for their comments on earlier drafts of
this Article. Our research has been generously supported by Fordham University School of
Law and Vanderbilt Law School.
I
BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1526 (8th ed. 2004). The Latin root of "tort" refers to
conduct that is twisted (i.e., lacking in rectitude) while also twisting (i.e., interfering with
the rights of others). JOHN C. P. GOLDBERG, ANTHONVJ. SEBOK & BENJAMIN C. ZIPUiRSKY,
t

tt

TORT LAw: RESPONSIBILITIES AND REDRESS

3 (2004).

2 SeeJohn C.P. Goldberg, The ConstitutionalStatus of Tort Law: Due Process and the Right
to a Law for the Redress of Wrongs, 115 YALE L.J. 524, 541-51 (2005). Medieval English law
referred to torts as "trespasses," using the term in its biblical sense to refer to transgressions
by one against another. See GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 1, at 47 (discussing actions for
trespass and trespass on the case).
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been breached. Substantive tort doctrine is filled with rules and con3
cepts that express the idea of one person wronging another.
Obvious as the foregoing observations may seem, the claim that
tort law is a law of wrongs is today controversial, perhaps even in disfavor. A major source of the trouble is this: the idea of committing a
wrong carries obvious moral connotations, yet some fundamental features of tort doctrine seem to cast doubt on whether tort really has
anything to do with wrongful conduct. In particular, liability often
seems to stem more from bad luck than from bad acts or bad character. Thus the question arises: Is tort liability so luck-dependent that
tort law, despite appearances, cannot be taken seriously as a law of

wrongs?
Consider the following passages, penned almost a century apart
by Justice Holmes and Judge Posner. Note how they harness ideas of
misfortune and happenstance to bolster a claim about tort law and
negligence in particular:
The law considers ...

what would be blameworthy in the aver-

age man, the man of ordinary intelligence and prudence, and determines liability by that. If we fall below the level in those gifts, it is
our misfortune ....4

The morality of the fault system is very different from that of
everyday life. Negligence is an objective standard. A man may be
adjudged negligent though he did his best to avoid an accident and
just happens to be clumsier than average. In addition, a number of
the established rules of negligence liability are hard to square with a
moral approach. Insane people are liable for negligent conduct
though incapable of behaving carefully. Employers are broadly responsible for the negligence of their employees ....

The moral

element in such cases is attenuated.
... It is true that injury inflicted by carelessness arouses a different reaction from injury inflicted as the result of an unavoidable
accident. We are indignant in the first case but not the second.

3 For example, many arguments that can defeat a tort action do so by establishing
that the defendant's conduct was not a wrong or not a wrong to the plaintiff. A good
example is consent; victim consent renders conduct that would otherwise be tortious nonwrongful. See, e.g., Florida Publ'g Co. v. Fletcher, 340 So.2d 914, 916 (Fla. 1976) (stating
that consent is a defense to an action for trespass); Duncan v. Scottsdale Med. Imaging,
Ltd., 70 P.3d 435, 438 (Ariz. 2003) ("A battery claim is defeated, however, when consent is
given."). Similarly, a shopkeeper's detention of a suspected shoplifter based on reasonable
suspicion of theft is deemed privileged and therefore not a wrong. See, e.g., Dillard Dep't
Stores, Inc. v. Silva, 148 S.W.3d 370, 372 (Tex. 2004). In asserting any of these and various
other defenses, a defendant is claiming that conduct that would otherwise be wrongful is
nonwrongful, or at least not a wrong to the plaintiff.
4
OLIVER W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 108 (48th prtg. 1923).
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The interesting question is why.... The orthodox view [of negli5
gence as a moral concept] gives no answer.
Now consider how two other prominent scholars, Jeremy Waldron
and Christopher Schroeder, emphasize fortuity and chance to make a
rather different point about torts.
Two drivers, named Fate and Fortune, were on a city street one
morning in their automobiles ....

As they passed through a shop-

ping district, each took his eyes off the road, turning his head for a
moment to look at the bargains advertised in a storefront window ....
In Fortune's case, this momentary distraction passed without event. . . . Fate, however, was not so fortunate. . . . His car

ploughed into a motorcycle ridden by a Mr. Hurt. Hurt was flung
from the motorcycle and gravely injured....
When Hurt recovered consciousness in [the] hospital, the first
thing he did was instruct his lawyers to sue Fate for negligence.
Considering the extent of his injury, the sum he sought was quite
modest-$5 million....

Most of us would say it is only fair that Hurt should win his
lawsuit: justice demands that Fate compensate him for the injury he
caused. It is difficult, however, to go beyond this intuition and explain exactly why it is fair that Fate should be expected to come up
with a sum of money this large.
The difficulty is exacerbated when we consider the other
driver, Mr. Fortune ....

He took his eyes off the road for the same

amount of time, violating the same duty of care owed to other road
users, for the sake of exactly the same advantage .... No one would
think it appropriate to require him to pay Hurt $5 million; yet his
behavior, morally speaking, was indistinguishable from that of
Fate ....

6

Under [tort rules that require proof of causation as a condition
of permitting recovery], the fortuity of causation must support a
sharp, dichotomous distinction between two individuals, one of
whom has caused harm and the other one-in all other respects
indistinguishable-has not. Likewise, the fortuity of causation must
support an equally sharp and dichotomous distinction between otherwise indistinguishable victims, one of whom suffers loss at the
hands of a human agent, the other of whom does not. Is there a
moral principle of such weight as tojustify thus partitioning defendants on the one hand and plaintiffs on the other hand, who are in
-5 Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, IJ. LEGAL STUD. 29, 31-32 (1972) (footnote omitted).
6 Jeremy Waldron, Moments of Carelessnessand Massive Loss, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW

387, 387-88 (David G. Owen ed., 1995).
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all other morally relevant respects equals? The fact of causation
seems too slender a reed, too weak a foundation, upon which to
7
base such sharp distinctions.
Each pair of passages-Holmes's and Posner's, on the one hand,
and Waldron's and Schroeder's on the other-makes a provocative
claim about the significance of a particular form of luck for tort law.
The latter pair argues that the way in which causal luck figures in the
attribution of tort liability renders tort law morally arbitrary. The fact
that causation serves as a predicate to tort liability and determines the
extent of liability, provides a basis for condemning tort law as a practice that purports to right wrongs, yet does so on unfair terms. Alternatively, the former pair suggests that tort law's indifference to
another kind of luck-what we will call compliance luck-provides a vital clue about how to make sense of this body of law. The suggestion
is that, until one grasps that negligence law is prepared to treat as
"wrongful" certain acts by persons who, because of bad luck, are incapable of acting otherwise, one will operate under the misimpression
that negligence law is concerned with identifying and responding to
moral wrongs. By the same token, once one grasps negligence law's
tolerance of bad compliance luck, one can appreciate that tort law is a
law of wrongs in name only; that the notion of wrong at work here is
so distinct from standard usage that it is better not to think of tort as a
law of wrongs at all.
Both arguments-that tort law is unjust because wrongdoers' liability turns too heavily on causal luck and that tort law must not be
doing what it appears to be doing because a genuine law of wrongs
would excuse bad compliance luck-are species of "moral luck" arguments, a philosophical genus that owes its name most immediately to
the work of Bernard Williams and Thomas Nagel. 8 Yet, in writing
about moral responsibility, neither Williams nor Nagel was anxious to
credit the sorts of arguments just discussed. 9 Quite the opposite, both
claimed that in judging the morality of an actor's conduct, it is a mis7

Christopher H. Schroeder, Causation,Compensation, and Moral Responsibility, in PHIL-

OSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW, supra note 6, at 347, 361.
8
See Thomas Nagel, Moral Luck, PROC. OF THE ARISTOTELIAN SOC'Y (Supp. L 1976),

reprinted in MORTAL QUESTIONS 24-38 (Thomas Nagel ed., 1979); Bernard Williams, Moral
Luck, PROC. OF THE ARISTOTELIAN SOC'V 115-35 (Supp. L 1976), reprinted in MORAL LUCK:

PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 1973-1980, at 20-39 (Bernard Williams ed., 1981). Both book
chapters are revisions of essays bearing the same titles. See Nagel, supra, at 28 n.3; Williams,
supra, at xiii. Nagel's essay was penned as a response to Williams's, with the latter generally
credited with having coined the phrase. See Nagel, supra, at 28 n.3. We are hardly alone in
linking these issues to the work of Nagel and Williams. See, e.g., Basil A. Umari, Note, Is
Tort Law Indifferent to Moral Luck?, 78 TEx. L. REv. 467, 467 (1999) (noting that the imposition of tort liability under current doctrine will sometimes necessarily turn on luck and
connecting the problems thereby raised to the work of Williams and Nagel).
9 See Nagel, supra note 8, at 33; Williams, supra note 8, at 37-39.
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take to suppose that one must exclude consideration of aspects of that
conduct over which the actor lacks control.10 Notions of wrongdoing,
fault, and blame, they insisted, are not in practice so fastidious, and
need not be as a matter of theory. In this Article, we develop a comparable set of claims about tort law.
Part I sets the stage for our analysis. In it, we briefly sketch how
Williams and Nagel articulate the "problem" of moral luck. We then
offer an equally compressed description of the relationship between
our claims about tort law and their claims about moral responsibility.
In Part II, we take on the causal luck critics of tort law, arguing
that the centrality of causation to tort liability provides no grounds for
condemning tort law as morally arbitrary. Tort, we explain, instantiates a distinctively legal conception of wrongdoing and responsibility
as opposed to a purely moral one. "I And it does so for a very particular purpose, namely, to empower victims of certain legal wrongs to
respond to their wrongdoers through legal action. Once tort law's
substance, structure, and purposes are properly understood, it becomes clear that the law is not capricious in requiring a victim as a
condition of tort liability, or in permitting some victims to recover
damage awards that are "out of proportion" to the gravity of the defendant's wrong.
In Part III, we argue that despite the indifference to bad compliance luck seen in negligence and other torts, there is no need to resort to elaborate reconstructions of tort law to salvage its intelligibility.
In particular, the problem of compliance luck does not warrant the
move made by Holmes and Posner-as well as by prominent corrective justice theorists-to treat tort as ultimately concerned with losses
and loss allocation rather than wrongs and the redress of wrongs. It is
cogent and justifiable to hold an actor responsible for having wronged
a victim even though the actor's lack of certain competencies left him
unable to meet the relevant standard of conduct.
In Part IV, we explore some of the implications of our rebuttal of
the two strands of moral luck argument identified above. Among
other things, we suggest that our perspective helps to clarify the sense
in which tort is a law of wrongs and redress and to illuminate what
values it serves within a modern administrative state. We also argue
10 See Nagel, supra note 8, at 38; Williams, supra note 8, at 37-39.
11 As this clause suggests, we agree with the likes of Holmes and Posner in supposing
that, as used in tort law, concepts like wrong and wrongdoing carry meanings that render
them distinct from their counterparts in certain forms of moral discourse. We part company with them in rejecting the claim that these differences are radical, as opposed to
subtle. As we explain below, the legal wrongs of tort are close cousins of moral wrongs.
Thus, we maintain that one can think of tort law as a law of wrongs without distorting its
substance, and indeed, that appreciating the sense in which tort is a law of wrongs is critical
to understanding it. See infra text accompanying notes 91-135.
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that tort law-which, notwithstanding the presence of causal and compliance luck, routinely holds individuals responsible to others in a very
tangible way-can help elucidate more abstract philosophical debates
12
about moral luck.
I
MoRAL AND LEGAL LUCK

Williams and Nagel invoked the phrase "moral luck" to capture a
tension between a seemingly attractive abstract principle of moral theory, on the one hand, and various intuitively powerful moral judgments on the other. 13 Accol-ding to the abstract principle, the moral
or immoral qualities of one's acts-and indeed their worth-cannot
depend on luck but must instead depend on how one chooses to act
and whether one acts as one ought to have acted. 14 From this premise, it seems to follow that when we consider holding an actor responsible for a wrong, we ought to focus only on certain
characteristics of the actor's actions, ruthlessly excluding from our
evaluations various fortuities, including the actor's innate endowments ("constitutive luck"), the background contours of the situation
in which she finds herself ("circumstantial luck"), and the consequences that happen to flow from her actions ("causal luck").15 Yet,
notwithstanding the appeal of these ideas, when one actually considers how culpability and blame are assigned in real life, it is evident
that ordinary moral judgment is sensitive to luck.
Consider Mr. Gower, the druggist from the movie, It's A Wonderful
Life. 16 As the narrative first unfolds, Gower, devastated and drunk
over the news of his son's death from influenza, accidentally misfills a
12 Our concern in this Article is the significance of two much-discussed forms of
luck-causal and compliance luck-for holding actors responsible in tort. We will not
address or address only in passing various other forms of luck that matter to the operation
of the tort system. Obviously, "luck" also operates on the victim's side of the equation, if
only in the sense that it is the innocent victim's bad luck to be injured by another. Some
will suppose that an appreciation of the centrality of victim misfortune to tort law supports
the normative proposition that tort ought to be replaced with a social safety net that, in
providing a general form of disaster insurance, promises to do a betterjob of aiding victims
in overcoming bouts of bad luck. Briefly, we regard this sort of position as resting on a non
sequitur: it is desirable to provide individuals with a safety net, but- that still leaves the
question of whether we might also want a body of law that permits the subset of unfortunate victims whose misfortunes are caused by the wrongful acts of others to seek redress
against those others. Along somewhat different lines, a number of prominent tort theorists
have argued (more in an interpretive than prescriptive vein) that the very point of tort law
is to set rules for determining which among all the setbacks suffered by innocent victims
are another person's responsibility and which are simply misfortunes that the victim herself must bear. See infra text accompanying notes 137-64.
13 See Nagel, supra note 8, at 24-25; Williams, supra note 8, at 20.
14 See Nagel, supra note 8, at 24-25.
15 See id. at 28 (distinguishing among these different forms of luck).
16

IT's A WONDERFUL LiFE (RKO Radio Pictures 1946).
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prescription with poison. Fortunately, young George Bailey catches
the mistake before harm is done, and Gower lives out his life as a
respected member of the community. Later, when we see what the
world would have been like had George not existed, the course of
Gower's life has changed markedly. Without George to catch his mistake, Gower serves twenty years in prison for poisoning a child and
becomes a pathetic drunk. The harsher fate of the "second Gower"
attests to the commonsense idea that a mistake is somehow worse and
warrants a more severe assessment and response when it injures another. But, as a matter of theory, it seems plausible to argue that each
of the two Gowers committed precisely the same wrongful act-drunkenly substituting poison for medicine-and that one should not judge
Gower's actions differently based on the mere fortuity of George's intervention or nonintervention. Is it right for the citizens of Bedford
Falls to condemn Mr. Gower for his mistake when it happens to
poison, but to refrain from condemning him or to condemn him on
less harsh terms 17 when it happens not to poison?18
For our purposes, three complementary aspects of Williams's and
Nagel's analyses of this conundrum are most important. 19 First, by
reflecting on numerous examples that involve not only what people
say or do in sanctioning others but also how people assess their own
conduct and that of others, they make a case for concluding that contingencies influence moral assessments in a non-superficial way and
that such influence is not a concession to "irrational" or merely customary ways of making such assessments. Indeed, they argue, contingencies play a deep and almost paradoxical role in ordinary normative
thinking. Second, by establishing that moral judgments routinely invoke matters over which agents lack control as salient grounds for
evaluation, Williams and Nagel provide at least prima facie grounds
17
For example, a licensing authority could have issued a fine or required professional
recertification.
18 Although this episode mainly illustrates the causal luck version of moral luck, it
also might be seen to present the problems of circumstantial luck (but for living amidst an
influenza epidemic, Gower never would have lost his son and never would have been rendered distraught) and constitutive luck (but for his being blessed with a stronger constitution, Gower would not have coped with his devastation by drinking on the job to the point
of substantial intoxication).
Gower's story is not a perfect example of causal luck because in the first scenario,
George, on a vow to Gower, never tells anyone of Gower's mistake. Hence, we never learn
how Gower's townfolk would have assessed his conduct. A clue is provided, however, in the
fact of earnest George's vow, which suggests that the mistake was not sufficiently grave in
his mind to require him to expose it. By contrast, it is hard to imagine George making the
same vow if Gower's mistake actually poisoned the child. On this basis, we can perhaps
assume that even if the good citizens of Bedford Falls had somehow learned of the first
version of Gower's mistake, they would not have seen fit-and their law would not have
permitted them-to send the druggist to jail for twenty years.
19 For thoughtful analyses of various aspects of Williams's and Nagel's articles, see

MORAL LUCK (Daniel Statman ed., 1993).
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for skepticism about the general principle that luck's influence should
be excluded from such evaluations. Finally, by pushing hard on examples where fortuities significantly affect how one would regard an
agent's character, actions, and even the successfulness of her life,
their examples somewhat ironically highlight the appeal of a moral
theory that promises to render moral assessment independent of bad
luck. In a backhanded way, they help to portray moral theories that
focus relentlessly on good will as understandable, if ultimately illfated, efforts to preserve morality as a domain in which fortune has no
influence.
Williams and Nagel integrated these points in different ways. For
our purposes, each position is illuminating. To Williams, the aspiration to understand value in such a way that our assessments of it can
be immunized from bad luck was symptomatic of a wrong turn in
moral theory traceable at least to Kant. 20 In his view, to recognize the

extent to which assessments of conduct are luck-sensitive is to appreciate the artificiality of the aspiration to gauge wrongfulness exclusively
by reference to an actor's will or efforts. This aspiration, according to
Williams, ought to be abandoned for a mode of thought that is less
systematic, less theoretical, and less insulated from the realities of
what gives meaning to individual human lives. Nagel, on the other
hand, emphasized a seemingly self-defeating aspect of the Kantian
ideal of morality operating outside the realm of the contingent. Luck,
he observed, is inevitably a component of human action, if only in
helping to generate the circumstances for action. To purge contingencies from assessments of conduct is to undermine the very ideas of
agency and responsibility. 21 Yet Nagel did not see in this argument a
straightforward refutation of the Kantian project. Instead, he argued
that it is fundamentally incomplete-that it is only from one important kind of philosophical perspective that moral appraisal can be understood in a manner that leaves little or no room for luck. On his
view, a full understanding of the nature of moral problems must address how it is that, in human thought, we shift back and forth be-

20

Williams, supra note 8, at 20 & n.1 (citing Kant's work in connection with his

description of a view of moral evaluation that seeks to exclude the influence of contingencies). We do not take a position on whether Kant himself was committed to a conception
of morality that called for the exclusion of contingencies in moral assessment. See, e.g.,
John Gardner, The Wrongdoing that Gets Results, 18 PHIL. PERSP. 53, 66 (2004) (arguing that
it is a mistake to attribute to Kant the aspiration to render morality an entirely "luck-free
zone.")
21 See Nagel, supra note 8, at 35 (arguing that because choices and acts are themselves
influenced by contingencies about the actor and his or her circumstances, luck cannot be
fully removed from moral assessment without the adoption of a deterministic account of
human behavior that is incompatible with treating acts and choices as genuinely
volitional).
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tween perspectives in which morality is luck-sensitive and perspectives
in which it is not.
As our title suggests, this Article is in part inspired by Williams's
and Nagel's work. Still, it would be misleading to claim that it builds
upon their writing in a straightforward way, except in one important
respect. We take for granted that, at least since the publication of
their articles, the following argument is not self-evident or obviously
sound:
(a) the conceptual structure of moral duties is such that a person
cannot have breached a moral duty by doing A if whether she did A
was outside of her control;
(b) the putative duties of tort law are such that a person can have
breached that duty regardless of whether doing A was outside of her
control;
(c) the putative duties of tort law do not have the conceptual structure of moral duties.
If not actually proving (a) false, Williams and Nagel certainly cast serious doubt upon it, such that one can no longer assume (a) is true and

22
therefore cannot assume that conclusion (c) is sound.
Gratefully accepting this starting point, we will in the remainder
of our analysis offer a tort-theoretic argument that essentially runs parallel to Williams's and Nagel's moral-theoretic arguments. Thus, instead of contemplating the content and structure of moral judgments
that people render and act upon in ordinary life, we will consider the
content and operation of tort law. The latter, it turns out, not only
permits but requiresthat fortuity play an important role in determining
when and how actors will be held accountable for their actions. Second, we observe that, because the issue in tort law of whether one has
breached a duty to another is so obviously luck-sensitive, tort practice
poses a conundrum for tort theorists comparable to the problem of
moral luck: either the notion of being held accountable for breach of
a duty owed to another is not as luck-insensitive as some suppose, or
tort law really cannot purport to be-as it does-a law of duties,
wrongs, and responsibilities. Third, we mean to acknowledge and
confront the discomfort that often goes hand-in-hand with legal
luck-a discomfort of the same type as that which has led some moral
22
John Gardner argues on independent grounds that what we have labeled "(a)" in
the text is false. Asjust mentioned, supra note 20, he maintains that Nagel and others have
overstated in important ways the degree to which Kant's moral theory sought to divorce
assessments of the rectitude of actions from factors beyond an actor's control and, likewise,
have overstated the breadth of the principle that "ought" implies "can" to which Kant adhered. Nevertheless, he concludes that Kant did adhere to a version of the view that moral
value is secured by trying to do the right thing, as opposed to succeeding in doing it, and
that this view is insupportable. See Gardner, supra note 20, at 66-77. Of course, we do not
necessarily mean to commit ourselves to the truth of (b) (at least in that broad form).
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philosophers toward good-will oriented views of moral value. In particular, we aim to expose and grapple with the pressure felt by theorists to reconceptualize tort liability in a manner that detaches tort
from notions of wrongfulness or wrongdoing. Like Williams, we are
hopeful that, by exposing an important source of these theorists' attraction to non-wrongs-based views of tort, we can begin to establish
the untenability of such views. Like Nagel, we are hopeful that candor
about the deep and pervasive role of luck in tort law will point toward
a richer, more satisfactory theoretical framework for understanding
concepts of duty, wrong, responsibility, and liability in the law. Such a
framework, we argue, renders the idea of "legal luck" less discomfiting
in part by demonstrating the perspectival or contextual nature of normative assessment.
II
CAUSAL LUCK AND THE CRITIQUE OF
TORT LAW AS ARBITRARY

Here we consider and rebut two iterations of the causal luck critique of tort law. The first focuses on the role of causation in determining whether or not a tort has occurred. The second concerns the
role of causation in determining the extent of a tort victim's injuries
and therefore, to some degree, the extent of the tortfeasor's liability.
A.

Fortuity as to Realization

Nagel illustrated the significance of causal luck for attributions of
responsibility with a now-familiar example:
If someone has had too much to drink and his car swerves on to the
sidewalk, he can count himself morally lucky if there are no pedestrians in its path. If there were, he would be to blame for their
deaths, and would probably be prosecuted for manslaughter. But if
he hurts no one, although his recklessness is exactly the same, he is
guilty of a far less serious legal offence and will certainly reproach
23
himself and be reproached by others much less severely.
As Waldron's contrastive tale of Fate and Fortune demonstrates, 24 the
same example plays out even more starkly under basic tort principles.
In tort, the morally lucky driver not only faces a lesser penalty or sanction; he faces none at all as there is no one with grounds to bring a
claim in response to his reckless driving. This observation in turn provides the basis for criticizing what can be dubbed the "realization" requirement in tort law.
23
24

Nagel, supra note 8, at 29.
See supra text accompanying note 6.
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Via tort, government is prepared to force someone who has behaved badly-that is, in violation of a legal norm of right conduct-to
compensate another by virtue of the wrongdoer's having so behaved.
Yet the duty to compensate only attaches if the behavior happens to
cause a certain sort of harm, such as physical injury. As critics of the
realization requirement argue, law that imposes sanctions on actors
for having behaved badly ought to tie those sanctions to the existence
or absence of the qualities that render the relevant conduct bad in the
requisite sense (e.g., insufficiendy careful, in the case of legal negligence). But tort law does not do this because fortuities as to realization, which have no bearing on the moral qualities of the defendant's
act, necessarily figure in the determination of whether the duty to
compensate will attach. Therefore, tort law is morally arbitrary or otherwise so normatively unappealing as to be an unjustifiable feature of
our legal system, at least given the presence of less luck-dependent
alternatives for responding to misconduct and losses. 25 At a mini26
mum, tort law is subject to serious criticism for being unfair.
25

For iterations of this argument in addition to Schroeder's and Waldron's, see

GUIDO CALABREsi, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 306 (1970);

Larry A. Alexander, Causationand CorrectiveJustice: Does Tort Law Make Sense?, 6 L. & PHIL. 1,
12-17 (1987); and Ronen Avraham & Issa Kohler-Hausmann, Accident Law for Egalitarians,
12 LEGAL THEORY 181, 181 (2006).
26 Waldron's critique is more cautious than this sentence might suggest because he
denies that he is judging the intelligibility or fairness of tort liability by measuring it against
principles underlying criminal punishment. See Waldron, supra note 6, at 390-91. Yet, as
indicated below, his arguments are still vulnerable to the critique put forward here.
Although he does not wish to characterize liability as punishment, Waldron nonetheless ignores the distinction between the state itself imposing a sanction, a fine, or liability,
on the one hand, and the state empowering an individual to exact damages, on the other.
A case of liability-imposition, in his view, is a case in which the state orders that the victim's
loss be shifted to the tortfeasor and not an instance of the state authorizing the victim to
seek redress.
Admittedly, Waldron at one point acknowledges that some theorists emphasize that
tort is about holding a defendant responsible to the plaintiff for having wrongfully injured
the plaintiff. See id. at 399. But with one peculiar hypothetical involving multiple careless
drivers-an example that probably should be analyzed as an instance ofjoint liability on a
concert-of-action theory-he dismisses the possibility of harnessing causation and the realization of harm to flesh out a cogent conception of a law that holds tortfeasors responsiblefor
having wrongfully injured victims. Id. at 399-400.
Finally, while Waldron's critique focuses less on the incoherence of tort law and more
on its supposed unfairness, he does not anticipate how tort law can be understood to instantiate values that cohere with many of our legal and political system's basic normative
commitments, including the recognition of core individual rights, by standing ready to
provide each citizen with a power to seek redress in the event she is wronged. See
Goldberg, supra note 2, at 596-611. Moreover, he dismisses too hastily the mechanisms
that ameliorate the unfairness in tort law. See Waldron, supra note 6, at 388-89. These
include mandatory liability insurance for automobile owners, a broad delegation to juries
on the issue of the quantum of damages that may be fairly awarded, and a broad array of
settlement practices largely keyed to available insurance coverage. See Tom Baker, Liability
Insurance, Moral Luck, and Auto Accidents, 9 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. (forthcoming Jan.

1134

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 92:1123

Our response to those who treat fortuity as to realization as the
basis for a critique of tort law is that they have failed to appreciate the
particular sort of institution tort law is and the particular notions of
wrongdoing and responsibility to which it gives expression. In denouncing tort law as morally arbitrary, these critics mistakenly treat
27
tort as if it instantiates a notion of culpability-based punishment.
Suppose for the sake of argument that criminal liability and punishment are properly determined only by reference to the "intrinsic"
quality of an actor's actions (i.e., the actor's capacities, her mental
state at the time of acting, her reasons for action, and the potential for
harm associated with her actions) and not based on any consequences
flowing from them. Now further suppose that, under these criteria,
Nagel's two reckless drivers deserve identical criminal punishments
because both undertook the identical act of reckless driving for the
same reasons under the same circumstances. Even conceding these
points, we maintain that they do not provide the basis for a critique of
tort law. For what underwrites them is an implicit view about the perspective that the law adopts when condemning and punishing the
drivers' conduct. This is the perspective of a community, a society, or
a state, where the question being asked is: How should we, as appropriately disinterested observers, assess the propriety of and respond to
a given actor's misconduct?
By contrast, if one considers the conduct from the victim's perspective, the issue of how to assess the conduct is framed quite differently.28 The reckless driver who hits the pedestrian has not only
committed an antisocial act of a sort that entitles observers to condemn his actions and the state to sanction him; he has also wrongfully
injured the victim. The victim is specially situated with regard to the
driver's actions, such that it would be odd not to expect that her reaction to those actions will be distinct from others'. The point is not
2008) (explaining how insurance law systematically ameliorates the apparent harshness
displayed by Waldron's examples).
27 See Arthur Ripstein & Benjamin C. Zipursky, CorrectiveJustice in an Age of Mass Torts,
in PHILOSOPrY AND THE LAW OF TORTS 214, 222-23, 225 (Gerald J. Postema ed., 2001)

(emphasizing the distinction between tort liability and punishment).
28
Others have emphasized (as have we in earlier writings) that, in both law and morality, responsibility to a victim is a special form of responsibility, distinguishable from responsibility to the state or to persons who stand in some other relation to wrongdoing. See,

e.g., CHRISTOPHER KUTZ, COMPLICITY-" ETHICS AND LAW FOR A COLLECTIVE AGE 20-22 (2000)
(noting that moral norms, like norms of etiquette, are often "positional" in the sense that
those more immediately affected by norm violations are generally thought warranted in
having a different sort of reaction than, say, bystanders); JEFFRIE G. MURPHY & JULES L.
COLEMAN, PHILOSOPHY OF LAW: AN INTRODUCTION TOJURISPRUDENCE 146 (rev. ed. 1990) (in
contrast to crimes, "there are no torts w.'hout victims and their Iosses");JEFP.RE G. MURPHY
& JEAN HAMPTON, FORGIVENESS AND MERCY 21 (1988)

(distinguishing forgiveness from

mercy in part on the ground that only a victim has standing to forgive an offense insofar as
it is a wronging of her).
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simply that one can predict the pedestrian to be resentful and vengeful toward the driver. It is that the pedestrian is entitled to feel that way
because the driver has done something wrong to her that he has not
done to anyone else (assuming that no one else was run over, frightened, or otherwise adversely affected). 29 The reckless driver, when his
recklessness ripens into the running down of a victim, is literally response-able by (and therefore to) the victim-and perhaps the victim's
kin-in a way that the reckless driver who does not injure anyone is
not. True, it is perfectly plausible to say that the lucky bad driver who
hits no one has acted in a blameworthy fashion. But because his conduct has no victim, it cannot be blameworthy as a wrongful injuring of
someone else.
At a minimum, these considerations suggest that a legal regime in
which only the "unlucky" driver is saddled with liability is neither incoherent qua law of wrongs nor facially puzzling and unappealing from a
normative perspective if the liability takes the form of a response by a
person who can justifiably complain that the conduct constitutes a
wrong to her. And, of course, that is exactly what is going on in a
standard tort suit. What renders tort law distinctive as a law of wrongs
is that it is not a device by which the state sanctions or penalizes blameworthy conduct on behalf of itself or the populace. Rather, it is a law
that empowers victims to respond to wrongdoers whose wrongs have
injured them. Absent an "injuring," there is no victim to complain of
the conduct, and hence no basis for a tort suit or tort liability. 0 To
say the same thing affirmatively, tort law requires that fortuities as to
realization be considered in assessing liability precisely because tort
law is a victim-based law of wrongs rather than a community-based or
society-based law of wrongs. 3 ' Tort law identifies domains of conduct
29 See KUTZ, supra note 28, at 20-25 (discussing "warranted" responses to inappropriate conduct).
30 John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Unrealized Torts, 88 VA. L. REV. 1625,
1636-60 (2002) (arguing that tort does not permit recovery absent injury).
31 These are precisely the terms by which tort was distinguished from crime by Locke,
Blackstone, and many subsequent eighteenth and nineteenth century jurists, as well as by
the likes of Cardozo. Goldberg, supra note 2, at 541-51. Professor Weinrib has made a
similar point in referring to the inherent "bipolarity" of tort liability as a form of corrective
justice. ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAw 155-56 (1995).

Although our ac-

count of tort shares Weinrib's emphasis on relational wrongs and their rectification, it does
not advance a corrective justice theory of tort and does not mount an argument derived
from Aristotlean and Kantian theory.
Needless to say, it has been popular among twentieth and twenty-first century theorists
to treat tort law as if it were law by which the state harnesses private lawsuits to achieve
public policy goals such as deterrence or loss spreading. We have criticized such theories
as interpretively deficient elsewhere. See, e.g., John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin Zipursky,
Accidents of the Great Society, 64 MD. L. REV. 364, 384-408 (2005) (criticizing Calabresi's
effort to reduce the aspiration of tort law to the goal of accident cost minimization); John
C.P. Goldberg, Twentieth-Centuy Tort Theoy, 91 GEO. L.J. 513, 521-62 (2003) (discussing
criticisms of various instrumentalist theories of tort).

1136

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 92:1123

that constitute a mistreatment of one person by another, such that the
person who suffers the mistreatment is entitled to some sort of recourse against the wrongdoer. Accordingly, moral luck critiques that
focus on the fortuity of realization simply have no bearing on the enterprise of tort law given what that enterprise aims to accomplish.
Describing tort as a law of privately actionable legal wrongs does
not require us to deny government's role in tort. After all, the government provides the institutions, the officials, and the law that enable
one person to sue another and to secure enforcement through court
order or police assistance. For this reason, it may be tempting to suppose that tort judgments, no less than criminal punishments, are issued from the perspective of society or the state. 32 But the
government's job in this arena is that of Lockean umpire, not criminal
prosecutor. By providing tort law and related remedies through its
courts, government grants a victim the power to exact a remedy from
one who has legally wronged her. This empowerment is significant
not only because of the identity of the recipient-private citizens,
firms, and government in its capacity as right holder (e.g., as property
owner)-but also because it is irrevocable and non-reviewable. If the
victim decides to sue and follows the right procedures, executive
branch officials have no authority to stop or take over the litigation, as
they do, typically, in criminal prosecutions and qui tam actions. Likewise, if the victim decides not to sue, the state has nothing to say; governmental officials cannot force prosecution of a claim even if they
have compelling grounds for supposing that the suit would promote
some important public objective. 33 Tort law is a government-sponsored system for responding to wrongdoing by arming putative victims
with private rights of action-legal powers to bring claims, at their discretion, for damages and other relief based on wrongs done to
4
them .
That tort law is victim-initiated law is only part of the story,
though. Other structural features suggest that it is concerned with
wrongful conduct only insofar as that conduct amounts to an injuring
of one or more victims. 35 Consider, for example, the legal concept of

injury. A person who is affected by another's misconduct in a manner
32
And, of course, the Supreme Court has on occasion deemed the enforcement of
tort judgments to be state action for purposes of constitutional law. See BMW of N. Am.,
Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 573 n.17 (1996); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 265
(1964).
13 See Benjamin C. Zipursky, Philosophy of Private Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 623, 632-36, 49-51 (lules Coleman & Scott Shapiro eds., 2002).
4
Id.
35
Injuring in this sense means, roughly, one person depriving another of rights by
virtue of conduct that amounts to wrongful interference with a basic interest.
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that the law does not credit as a cognizable harm has no standing to
pursue a claim on the basis of that conduct. 36 In addition, for conduct to be tortious, it must not only be wrongful in some generic sense
(i.e., antisocial) but also relationallywrongful-wrongful with respect to
the victim who complains of the wrongdoing. 3 7 As we have observed
elsewhere, torts are structured around norms that are relational in
their analytic structure.3 8 These norms specify how a certain kind of
actor must act or must not act toward other persons. For example, the
tort of libel (leaving aside constitutional refinements) dictates that
one may not publish a statement about the plaintiffthat tends to harm
reputation so as to cause injury to the plaintiffs reputation. Thus, if
one prints a statement that tends to harm reputation but that is about
a third party (not about the plaintiff), the plaintiff has no cause of
39
action for defamation because the statement has not defamed her.
This is so even if the statement causes her injury and even if injury to
her was foreseeable. 40 Likewise, while the tort of trespass to land forbids one from physically invading another's property, 4' only persons
with possessory rights in the relevant property can claim to have been
trespassed against by acts that amount to an invasion of that prop42
Absent such rights, they cannot sue for trespass even if the
erty.
invasion caused them harm, for the trespass is only a trespass as to
others, differently situated. 43 Similarly, the tort of fraud requires not
just a misrepresentation that causes loss to another, but a misrepresentation that amounts to the deception of that other.44 And so too for
negligence, which requires that the defendant's conduct not merely
constitute "negligence in the air," but carelessness with respect to the
45
plaintiff or persons such as the plaintiff.
Assume, for example, D is driving recklessly in pedestrian P's presence, and that P
36
is intensely annoyed, but does not fear for his physical well-being. P has suffered an adverse effect because of D's wrongful conduct as to him, but not the sort of adverse effect
that counts as an injury in the eyes of the law.
37
The idea of relationality, expressed through the notion of "substantive standing," is
first articulated in Benjamin C. Zipursky, Rights, Wrongs, and Recourse in the Law of Torts, 51
VAND. L. REV. 1, 3-5 (1998). Various writings have subsequently developed and deployed
this concept. See, e.g.,John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Moral of MacPherson, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1733, 1812-32 (1998).
38
See Zipursky, supra note 37, at 17-18.
39
Id.
40
See id. at 17 n.53.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 158 (1965).
41
Lal v. CBS, Inc., 726 F.2d 97, 100 (3d Cir. 1984).
42
See, e.g.,
43
See id.
44
E.g., Banco Popular N. Am. v. Gandi, 876 A.2d 253, 260 (N.J. 2005). SeeJohn C.P.
Goldberg, AnthonyJ. Sebok & Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Place of Reliance in Fraud,48 ARIZ.
L. REv. 1001, 1011 (2006); Zipursky, supra note 37, at 18-20.
45
Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 99 (N.Y. 1928) ("Negligence is not
actionable unless it involves the invasion of a legally protected interest, the violation of a
right."); Zipursky, supra note 37, at 7-15, 27.
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Our basic point, then, is this: Tort law identifies conduct that is
wrongful in the particular sense of being a mistreatment of one by
another, and provides recourse through law to the victim against the
wrongdoer. It is, in short, a law of wrongs and redress, not a law of
punishment on the basis of blame or desert. Criticizing this sort of
law for linking attributions of responsibility and liability to the fortuity
of realization simply misses the point of having it in the first place.
The wronging of one person by another is the very essence of the
enterprise, and until such an event happens, there is no occasion to
inquire whether an actor can or should be held to have acted wrongfully by violating a moral or legal obligation of conduct.
A causal luck critic might complain that we are relying on an unduly narrow notion of injury and thus have overstated the contrast
between criminality (using the conception we have presumed for purposes of argument) and tortiousness. A broader definition of injury
that includes not only physical harm, emotional distress, and property
damage but also increased risks of those harms would leave less of a
role for fortuity as to realization in tort law and thereby narrow the
gap between criminal law and tort. Given the latter definition of injury, for example, there will be fewer "lucky" reckless drivers since persons who are sufficiently proximate to bad driving to be placed at
greater risk of physical injury would now have the basis for a viable
tort claim.
This line of criticism suffers from several weaknesses. First, it
does not eliminate the significance for tort of fortuities as to realization. Instead, it promises only to reduce the number of instances in
which the problem will arise. Even under a heightened-risk-as-cognizable-harm conception of tort, there still must be someone who is exposed to heightened risk of harm by an actor's wrongful conduct for
there to be a possible tort claim. Whether such a person is present is
no less a matter of fortuity than whether a person ends up suffering
physical harm as a result of that conduct.
Moreover, as we have argued elsewhere, the idea of treating exposure to risk of harm as an injury for purposes of tort law is both descriptively and pragmatically problematic. 46 Courts do not define the
tort of negligence as the careless exposure of another to heightened
risk of harms such as bodily injury. Instead, they typically require the
defendant to have acted carelessly with respect to another so as proximately to cause harm. In other words, negligence law in its main applications does not enjoin us to take care against risking harm to
others. Rather, it enjoins us to take care against causing harm to
others. Suppose Pcan prove to a certainty that D, by driving carelessly
46

See Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 30, at 1650-60.
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in proximity to P, increased for a moment the odds that D's driving
would physically harm P from one in a million to one in two. If that
risk never materializes, P and D are. both lucky, and P will not have a
viable negligence claim. 47 That negligence law treats mere risk exposure as noncognizable tells us something about the type of duty on
which it is built. It is, as one of us has explained elsewhere, a duty of
4
noninjuy as opposed to a duty of noninjuriousness. 9
Nor is it merely happenstance that negligence law and tort law
more generally are built on the idea that one owes duties to conduct
oneself in certain ways so as not to cause certain harms and not on a
duty to conduct oneself so as to avoid increasing others' risks of experiencing those harms. The latter sort of law would be difficult to administer reliably. 49 And, to the extent certain classes of tortfeasors
(e.g., product manufacturers) engage in conduct that wrongfully risks
physical injury to others, there is a worry-very much at issue in the
asbestos context today-about giving equal priority to claimants exposed to the risk of harm and plaintiffs who actually have suffered
harm. 50 Finally, courts' disinclination to fashion tort law around mere
duties of noninjuriousness probably reflects a political decision to allocate luck in a certain way. This allocation, in effect, is quite similar
to the political choice generally to hinge liability for accidental harms
on a showing of fault rather than by means of a rule of strict liability.
As Holmes famously argued, one reason why tort law as applied to
accidentally caused injuries usually looks for fault is to give actors
room to act. 5 ' To hold actors accountable simply on the ground that
their acts have caused injury risks generating overly burdensome obligations that could significantly infringe on liberty of action. The same
problem might well be true of a system that hinges liability on fault
but then treats increased risk of harm as injury sufficient to support a
tort cause of action. Indeed, the obligation to take care to avoid increasing others' risks of injury could overwhelm a citizen who is inclined to conform with tort law's directives. 5 2 Add to this the fact,
47
We are assuming that P does not suffer physical harm, emotional distress, or property damage. The same holds true for unrealized risks. To take an illustration we have
used before, suppose mall owner M is under a duty to take reasonable care to protect
patrons from criminal activity on the premises and that M is presently failing to do the
sorts of things that would fulfill that duty (e.g., providing adequate lighting or security
guards in its parking lots). Even though M's breach exposes patrons to the heightened
risk of a criminal attack, they have no basis for bringing a tort claim against M. Id. at
1651-52.
48
Ripstein & Zipursky, supra note 27, at 222-23.
49
Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 30, at 1652-53.
Id. at 1654.
50
51

HOLMES,

supra note 4, at 95.

For example, anyohe who is momentarily inattentive during a drive through a residential neighborhood stands a decent chance of increasing the risk of physical harm to
others and hence of committing a completed tort.
52
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noted above, that tort actions are private in the sense of being substantially controlled by victims, and there is a worry that one could find
oneself facing lawsuits on the basis of a good deal of everyday conduct.
Thus, in requiring realization in the form of physical harm, emotional
distress, property damage, or loss of wealth, tort law reflects a political
decision to circumscribe the kinds of injuries citizens are obligated to
be vigilant of, and thereby to give relatively greater room for liberty of
conduct.

53

For all these reasons, the idea that risk exposure is an injury unto
itself cannot eliminate or even substantially diminish the role of fortuity as to realization in tort law. This form of luck has always mattered
and should continue to matter in determinations of tort liability.
B.

Fortuity as to Extent of Loss

A related critique of tort law's tolerance for moral luck does not
concern fortuities as to whether some harm will occur to another by
virtue of one's wrongful acts but fortuities as to the magnitude of such
harm. The thin-skull rule is the most striking illustration of this problem. Under this rule, a tortfeasor whose tort causes massive harm only
because of a victim's hidden vulnerability is subject to liability for the
full value of the harm. 5 4 This result occurs even if the tortfeasor could
not have anticipated causing harm of this magnitude and even if requiring her to pay for such harm would amount to a disproportionate
punishment and could not be justified on grounds of specific or general deterrence. 55 But the problem goes beyond the thin-skull rule, as
Waldron's Fate and Fortune parable nicely illustrates. 56 What is generally taken to be the basic principle of tort damages-the idea of
making the victim whole-often entails a disjunction between the
sanction that a tortfeasor "deserves" for his misconduct, or the sanction that would appropriately deter, and how much he must actually
pay. Fortuity as to extent of liability thus seems to provide an independent ground for criticizing tort law's tolerance of moral luck.
Our reply to this criticism parallels our response to the criticism
of tort law for tolerating fortuities as to realization. 5 7 Tort law does
53
This is not to say that all law must do so. Often, criminal law and regulatory law
deem risk creation to be offenses, and one can of course be cited for speeding without
having harmed anyone. (Needless to say, there is a significant difference between the risk
of a regulatory fine for speeding and the risk of paying thousands or millions of dollars in
damages.) Our aim here is to adduce plausible reasons why the tort system, as a law of
private wrongs and redress, does and should shy away from giving victims a right of action
for damages against the wrongdoer merely for wrongful risk exposure.
54
See, e.g., Vosburg v. Putney, 50 N.W. 403, 404 (Wis. 1891).
55 Id.
56
See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
57
See supra Part I.A., II.A.
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not attempt to impose punishment on the tortfeasor in accordance
with a notion of desert or deterrence. 58 To say that a driver, for an
instant, drove carelessly and thereby proximately caused millions of
dollars in losses to another driver or a pedestrian is not to say that the
attendant liability represents a just or fair punishment of the driver.
Quite the opposite, qua criminal punishment, such liability might be
excessive within the meaning of the Excessive Fines Clause of the
Eighth Amendment.5 9 Yet the Supreme Court has said quite clearly
that compensatory damages payable to victims in civil actions are not
fines within the meaning of that Amendment, 6°1 and this holding is a
crucial piece of doctrinal evidence suggesting that our legal system
does not treat damage awards as punishments keyed to a notion of
desert. Likewise, it is now a familiar point of tort theory that the
make-whole measure of damages renders descriptively implausible
those theories of tort that purport to describe it as a scheme for deterrence. If tort law really were built around forward-looking concerns
for deterrence, then it ought to focus less than it does on the retrospective issue of how much loss a given victim happens to have experienced. This is why some have advocated for decoupling the
61
deterrence function of tort from its compensatory function.
But if tort damages are not issued in the name of punishment or
deterrence, can they be justified on some other basis? Or to put the
question more directly: How does the notion of make-whole compensation fit into tort law, understood as a law of wrongs and redress?
58
This claim needs to be qualified both as to punitive damages and as to tort theory
more generally. (1) Punitive damages. In some cases, victims can request that the
factfinder award punitive damages. Considerations of deterrence frequently influence the
size of that award. This is not to say, however, that the point of tort law or even of punitive
damages is to deter certain forms of wrongdoing. See generally Benjamin C. Zipursky, A
Theory of PunitiveDamages,84 TEX. L. REv. 105 (2005) (explaining punitive damages largely
in terms of plaintiffs expanded right of individual redress, while recognizing respects in
which some jurisdictions have invested punitive damages with a significant deterrent role).
(2) Tort Theory more generally. We are of course aware that the law and economics approach to tort theory-arguably the dominant theoretical paradigm today-is based
largely on the deterrence capacity of tort law. Suffice it to say that it is not our aim in this
Article to address that approach; we have done so elsewhere. See, e.g., Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 31; Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 37; Zipursky, supra note 37.
59
U.S. CONST. amend. VIII ("Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
imposed ....").
60
Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 263-64
(1989) (" [T] he Excessive Fines Clause ....does not constrain an award of money damages
in a civil suit when the government neither has prosecuted the action nor has any right to
receive a share of the damages awarded.").
61
See James J. Heckman, The Intellectual Roots of the Law and Economics Movement, 15
LAw & Hisr. REv. 327, 328-29 (1997). It is also why others, including Judge Posner, maintain that courts should award punitive damages on very different terms than they have
historically-to make up for instances of "under-litigation" or under-regulation, as opposed to allowing victims of egregious wrongs a special form of redress. See Mathias v.
Accor Econ. Lodging, Inc., 347 F.3d 672, 676-77 (7th Cir. 2003).
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Our initial response is to emphasize that the issue is not exactly
one of tort law, but of tort law's compatibility with a certain rule of
damages. That rule says, roughly, that when a tort victim successfully
sues her tortfeasor, she is ordinarily entitled to collect damages equal
to the value of past and future economic losses, pain and suffering,
and other losses. Although this rule provides a plausible metric for
what should count as meaningful redress in standard cases, tort law
could also operate in conjunction with other remedial rules. For example, one can readily envision the tort system incorporating a rule
that a tort victim may recover as much as ajury might consider fair or
reasonable under the circumstances. 62 Another (probably abhorrent)
rule might give the victim the option of collecting damages or demanding corporal punishment of the tortfeasor. 6 3 Each of these options is broadly compatible with the idea of tort law as a law of wrongs
and redress. In each case, the victim may initiate proceedings against
a person who has wrongfully injured her and stands to obtain a meaningful remedy. By contrast, if the rule of damages allowed the victim
to receive only a framed certificate acknowledging her injury, the system would fail to provide redress. 64 The question, in the end, is
whether the remedy is such that the victim should reasonably feel that
the law has taken her grievance seriously.
But what of the unfairness to the defendant who is made to pay
for massive losses resulting from minor delicts? The short answer is
that the law of tort remedies does not require proportionality between
the reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct and the amount of
the plaintiffs losses. Thus, the plaintiff may sometimes demand much
62
This was perhaps the dominant rule in Anglo-American law for personal injury
cases during the 1700s and into the mid-1800s. SeeJohn C.P. Goldberg, Two Conceptions of
Tort Damages: Fair v. Full Compensation, 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 435, 442-43 (2006). It may still
be the rule in many instances, given thatjury instructions often directjurors to assess compensation that is "reasonable" or "fair." See, e.g., KEVIN F. O'MALLEY ET AL., FEDERAL JURY
PRAcriCE AND INSTRUCriONS § 128.01 (5th ed. 2000) (stating that the jury should "award
plaintiff such sum as you believe will fairly andjustly compensate plaintiff'). Alternatively,
it may be the de facto practice in many tort cases, given the jury's broad discretion to
determine damages, at least for nonquantifiable losses.
63
This option was available to the victims of felonies in medieval English law. DavidJ.
Seipp, The Distinction Between Crime and Tort in the Early Common Law, 76 B.U. L. REv. 59,
61-68 (1996).
64 For some tort victims, namely those wrongfully injured by judgment-proof
tortfeasors, this sort of acknowledgment is about the only relief they stand to receive (minus the frame). That the legal system lets some tortfeasors escape liability in this way does
not reflect a principle of tort law or damages law. Rather, it results from the availability of
various asset-protection measures (e.g., the recognition of limited liability entities), bankruptcy law, and a lack of alternative remedies, such as the ancient-law remedy of impressing
a tortfeasor into the victim's personal service. The fact that other bodies of law impinge on
tort law's operation raises separate questions. In addition, we do not discuss here whether
there are judicially enforceable constitutional limits on the ability of courts and legislatures
to cap damages or otherwise eliminate or significantly curtail tort liability. See Goldberg,
supra note 2, at 611-26.
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more than the defendant, in one sense at least, deserves to pay. But to
note this facet of tort law is simply to observe that it provides recourse
through law and, as such, is not a system of proportional punishment
or efficient deterrence. The remedial question in standard tort cases
is not what the defendant deserves to pay given his wrongful behavior.
Nor is the question what the defendant ought to pay in light of the
state's interest in deterring such conduct. Rather, the question is
what the victim may legally extract from the defendant as redress for
the wrong done to him by the defendant. Surely, a plausible answer
to this question, at least for standard cases, is an amount equivalent to
the losses suffered because of the wrong. For other cases that involve
egregious wrongdoing, i.e., insult atop injury, a potentially broader
65
measure of damages might be appropriate.
Finally, tort law's reliance on a sometimes unforgiving remedial
rule does not suggest that the legal system as a whole should ignore the
actual and potential injustices resulting from that rule. Presumably,
this is one reason why modern law denies victims the right to demand
punishment of tortfeasors and why it affords bankruptcy protection
for tortfeasors who commit nonwillful torts. Concern for potential
unfairness may also help explain and justify the modern institution of
liability insurance. Although historically condemned as permitting actors to pass off responsibility, liability insurance is now generally regarded as a legitimate way to guard against potentially ruinous liability
arising from certain forms of wrongdoing.
III
COMPLIANCE LUCK AND THE NATURE OF ToRTious WRONGS

A.

Compliance Luck, Misfortune, and Loss-Shifting Theories of
Tort

Despite the scholarly attention paid to causal luck, it is not the
most troubling form of luck at work in tort law. After all, when one
focuses on fortuities linked to causation, one is looking at instances in
which an actor is presumed to have acted wrongfully in some respect
and thus can be presumed to deserve some type of sanction. Another
form of luck is not about the comparative fortune of differently situated wrongdoers or the undeserved good fortune of those whose
wrongful conduct does not generate injury. Instead, it is about how
easily tort liability is sometimes generated. Specifically, it is about actors who seem not to have behaved wrongfully in a full-blooded sense
but nevertheless face liability for injuries they have caused. Often
enough, an actor causes harm despite diligent efforts to comply with a
65 See Goldberg, supra note 62, at 442, 455-62; see also Zipursky, supra note 58, at
151-55.
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standard of conduct. On these occasions, only; the actor's bad luck
leads to her failure to comply with that standard. As a result, she faces
potential tort liability.
The form of liability just described is sometimes placed under the
ambiguous-and here positively unhelpful-heading of "strict liability." Instead of using that label, we will refer to these situations as
raising the issue of "compliance luck," that is, luck affecting one's ability to meet a relevant norm of conduct. Compliance luck is what
Holmes and Posner had in mind when arguing that negligence law
does not embrace a moral conception of fault. 66 The classic doctrinal
exemplar of compliance luck is the 1837 decision in Vaughan v.
Menlove.6 7 Menlove stacked hay in a manner that created a risk of
spontaneous combustion.6 8 The haystack later ignited, causing a fire
that damaged the property of his neighbor, Vaughan. 69 Menlove's
lawyer argued that his client had acted in the good faith belief that he
was behaving prudently and thus should not be held liable to
Vaughan. 70 The court disagreed and famously held that negligence
law sets an "objective" standard that measures conduct against the
care a person of ordinary prudence would have taken under the circumstances. 7 ' As Holmes later observed (and Posner echoed), the objective standard entails that persons who are, for whatever reason,
accident-prone or not well equipped to act with caution and prudence, can be found legally at fault. 72 For such people, this is a bit of

bad constitutive luck, i.e., the misfortune of not being well suited to
comply with certain demands of the law.
One can readily find versions of the same sort of misfortune in
more modern settings. A driver who rounds a corner ineptly and slips
off the road, injuring a pedestrian, can be held liable regardless of
whether she was trying her best or has made efforts to improve her
driving. And compliance luck need not be limited to cases of innate
inability. As Mark Grady famously emphasized, each of us will slip up
sooner or later and fail to act as the law requires. But only some of us
73
are unlucky enough to do so in circumstances that generate injury.
A very good surgeon who, on one occasion, happens to shake her
wrist at just the wrong moment so as to nick an artery is subject to
66

See supra text accompanying notes 4-5.

67

(1837) 132 Eng. Rep. 490 (C. P.).
Id. at 491.
Id.
See id. at 493.

68
69
70
71

See id.

supra note 4, at 108-09.
Mark F. Grady, Res Ipsa Loquitur and Compliance Error, 142 U. PA. L. REv. 887,
897-98 (1994).
72
73

HOLMES,
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liability for malpractice.7 4 A reliable waiter who on one occasion
clumsily drops scalding hot liquid on a customer can face liability.7 5 A
drug manufacturer that adopts generally sound safety protocols but
fails despite these measures to identify a harmful interaction between
its drug and another can be held responsible for causing those
harms. 76 In cases like these, good will, best efforts, and a track record
for responsible behavior is not enough to ward off negligence
liability.

77

Furthermore, negligence law's objective standard is not the only
instance of tort law's indifference to bad compliance luck, which can
take the form of circumstantial rather than constitutive luck. 78

For

example, the tort of trespass to land enjoins each of us to refrain from
interfering with property owners' rights of undisturbed possession. It
is possible that a defendant who is acting in an impeccable manner
will end up committing a trespass. Suppose D, prior to fencing his
yard, consults all relevant records to determine the location of the
property line between his property and his neighbor P's property.
Suppose also that D builds his fence strictly in accordance with the
information in those records. If it later turns out that the records
were, unbeknownst to anyone, erroneous, such that D's fence is in fact
79
sitting on P's property, P has a cause of action against D for trespass.
As in Vaughan, this is an instance of bad compliance luck. D violated a
norm of conduct forbidding one from physically invading another's
property, but D's violation did not stem from any lack of diligence on
D's part. Insofar as the liability is generated by features of the defendant's action that would not have been visible or otherwise accessible
to a person in the defendant's circumstances who was conscientiously
choosing a path of conduct, liability is turning on bad luck.
Examples such as these have led some tort scholars to worry
about the intelligibility and coherence of tort law. Yet, unlike causal
luck critics who purport to demonstrate the irredeemably arbitrary nature of tort law, many tort theorists who focus on tort law's insensitivity
to compliance luck claim that this facet of tort provides the key to
understanding tort law's aspirations. Holmes, for example, argued
that the objectivity of negligence law's conception of "fault" revealed
74 See, e.g., James Goudkamp, The Spurious Relationship Between Moral Blameworthiness
and Liabilityfor Negligence, 28 MELB. U. L. REV. 343, 350-52, 355 (2004) (identifying doctrinal features of negligence law, such as the objective standard of care, that undercut the
claim that liability for negligence is based on notions of moral blameworthiness).
75
See id.
76
See id.
77
See id.
78
See Nagel, supra note 8, at 28; supra note 15 and accompanying text (explaining the
difference between these forms of luck).
79
Burns Philp Food, Inc. v. Cavalea Cont'l Freight, Inc., 135 F.3d 526, 529 (7th Cir.
1998) (applying Illinois law).
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that the law is not actually concerned with holding people responsible
for committing wrongs against others.8 0 Instead, he argued, it marks
off the set of instances in which governments wedded to the classical
liberal principle of nonintervention in private affairs could nonetheless justifiably shift a loss suffered by one person to another.8 1 In a
related but distinct vein, Posner argues that negligence law's tolerance
of compliance luck tells us that, despite appearances, negligence law
(and tort law generally) is not a law of wrongs, but instead a scheme
by which private lawsuits predicated on victims' losses are harnessed
by judges as occasions on which to craft liability rules that incentivize
actors to make efficient expenditures on safety precautions.8 2 Judge
Calabresi similarly predicates his effort to design a scheme for the efficient deterrence of accidents on the idea that the legal wrongs of tort
83
are wrongs in name only.

The tendency to seize on the problem of compliance luck as a
basis for reconceptualizing tort law can be seen in the work of moral
skeptics such as Holmes, as well as law and economics advocates, such
as Posner and Calabresi.8 4 Some noninstrumentalist corrective justice
80
According to Holmes, this was precisely John Austin's mistake in characterizing
torts as a law under which the sovereign punished moral wrongs by holding wrongdoers
liable to their victims. HOLMES, supra note 4, at 107.
81 See id. at 79.
82
See generally Posner, supra note 5 (arguing that negligence law is set up to promote
efficient expenditures to prevent injury). 83
See Guido Calabresi, The Decisionfor Accidents: A Nonfault Allocation of Costs, 78 HARv.
L. REV. 713 (1965). In this early statement of his efficiency-based conception of liability,
Calabresi begins with the following observation:
I take it as given that the principal functions of "accident law" are to compensate victims and reduce accident costs .....
The notion that accident
law's role is punishment of wrongdoers cannot be taken seriously.
Whatever function we may wish to ascribe to punishment in criminal law, it
simply will not carry over to civil accident suits. If the time-honored,
though somewhat shopworn, distinctions between legal and moral fault and
between damages and degree of culpability which prevail in tort law do not
sufficiently demonstrate this proposition, then surely the prevalence of in-

surance priced on the basis of categories that have little to do with any
individual insured's "goodness" or "badness" must.
Id. at 713-14.
84
Compensation theorists have likewise argued that the objectivity of the fault standard reveals that negligence law, and tort law generally, cannot be understood as concerned with redressing wrongs, but instead are clumsy, expensive vehicles by which
government attempts to deliver compensation to unlucky accident victims. See PATRICK S.
ATIYAH, ACCIDENTS, COMPENSATION AND THE LAw 116-17 (1970). As Professor Patrick
Atiyah argued:
If the object were simply to condemn the defendant for paying insufficient attention to the interests of others, for preferring to risk the safety of
others in his own interest, for 'fault' or immoral conduct, then there would
plainly be a justification for subjectivising the standard of care. It is hard
for an inexperienced person to be condemned for failing to observe that
degree of skill which a more experienced person could show, to be told
that he should have foreseen this or that risk or should have taken this or
that precaution. But since the ultimate purpose of applying the negligence
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theorists have made similar arguments. For example, Arthur Ripstein
and Jules Coleman have argued that tort law is not concerned with
defining and articulating wrongs, but with achieving a fair allocation
of "misfortune," namely, losses that undeserving victims incur by virtue of others' conduct.8 5 And although corrective justice theorists including Ripstein, Coleman, Stephen Perry, and Tony Honor6 all
contend that tort law is fundamentally about responsibility, what they
86
have in mind is responsibility for losses, not answerabilityfor wrongs.
Hence, they do not view tort as a law for the redress of wrongs. Instead, they conceive tort as law that starts with the fact of the victim's
"misfortune" (her undeserved loss), then determines whether to shift
or reallocate that loss to another (or others) who may fairly be
deemed responsible for it. And the problem of compliance luck
seems to provide one of the reasons behind their attraction to lossbased conceptions of tort even where they recognize some conceptual
role for "wrongs. '8 7 That is, tort law's willingness to ignore the limited
formula is to decide if compensation should be paid to an innocent accident victim, the merits of whose claim may have little to do with the demerits of the defendant, there is a stronger tendency for the law to pull the
other way.
Id.; see also PETER CANE, ATIYAH'S ACCIDENTS, COMPENSATION AND THE LAw 41 (5th ed. 1993)
(reasoning that the objective fault standard demonstrates that it is not intended to reinforce norms of right conduct or deter anti-social conduct but to compensate accident
victims).
85
SeeJULES L. COLEMAN, RISES AND WRONGS 324-26 (1992); ARTHUR RipSTEIN, EQUALITy, RESPONSIBILITY, AND THE LAw 3 (1999). See generallyJules Coleman & Arthur Ripstein,
Mischiefand Misfortune, 41 McGILL L.J. 91 (1995) (arguing that tort law instantiates a political conception of fair loss allocation).
86
COLEMAN, supra note 85, at 324; TONY HONORt, RESPONSIBILITY AND FAULT 76-82
(1999) (arguing that tort law seeks to fairly allocate responsibilities for harms caused by
one to another); RiPSTEIN, supra note 85, at 56; Stephen R. Perry, The Moral Foundations of
Tort Law, 77 IowA L. REv. 449, 506-07 (1992) (invoking and refining Honor6's concept of
outcome-responsibility to support the claim that tort law determines when a person owes a
duty to repair another's loss on the basis of when that person is responsible for having
caused the loss).
One way to gauge the commitment of these corrective justice theorists to a notion of
tort as a law that shifts losses rather than as a law that provides recourse for victims of
wrongs is to consider the degree to which they distance themselves from Professor
Weinrib. Weinrib explicitly argues that tort corrects wrongs, not losses. See generally WEINRIB,
supra note 31. Notably, both Coleman and Perry have argued that Weinrib's focus on
wrongs instead of losses renders his theory interpretively problematic because it can only
explain why a wrongdoer ought to be punished and ignores what they see as the hallmark
question of tort law-why a wrongdoer owes the duty to compensate his victim. See COLEMAN, supra note 85, at 320-21; Perry, supra, at 479-80. By contrast, Professor Ripstein continues to profess allegiance to a roughly Weinribian view of tort law as embodying the
moral obligation of wrongdoers to repair their wrongs. RIPSTEIN, supra note 85, at 265-66.
As Ripstein also rejects Perry's critique of his views as essentially distributive, we are left
unsure of how, finally, to characterize his position.
87
See COLEMAN, supra note 85, at 324-25 (arguing that while tort is wrongs-based in
some sense, the fact that the "wrongs that fall within the ambit of corrective [justice] do
not mark a moral defect in the agent or in her action" should lead us to regard the normative system that tort law exemplifies as one requiring tortfeasors to bear the costs of the

1148

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 92:1123

capacity of certain persons to comply with tort standards seems to provide a reason, in their view, for treating tort law as a law of fairnessbased loss allocation rather than a law for the redress of wrongs. 88
We will refer to the members of this diverse family of views as
"allocative" tort theorists. Amidst their very pronounced differences,
they share two core ideas. The first is that the conduct that tort law
identifies as wrongful-as evidenced primarily by negligence law's objective fault standard and its indifference to compliance luck-is sufficiently removed from standard moral conceptions of wrongdoing that
tort cannot plausibly be what it appears to be, namely, law that empowers victims of wrongs to obtain redress from wrongdoers. The second is that, given tort law's idiosyncratically capacious notion of
wrongdoing, tort is more accurately and usefully understood as a
scheme by which government, for reasons of policy or principle, shifts
or allocates losses initially born by the unfortunate victim who has suffered physical injury, property damage, lost wealth, or emotional distress. Thus, the inquiry in a negligence or trespass case is not whether
an actor wronged the plaintiff in anything like a standard moral sense,
such that the plaintiff is now entitled to redress from the actor. Instead, the issue is whether the defendant's conduct renders him or
her an appropriate bearer of the victim's loss. In this view, the relevant question of liability entails consideration of one ore more of the
following factors: Who within our society is well situated to prevent or
spread the costs of accidents? What sort of actor ought to be given an
incentive to take steps to avoid certain harms or adverse consequences
in the future? When is it fair to ask one person to shoulder a burden
that has initially befallen someone else? Can or should the defendant
be deemed one who is responsible for the loss?
Critically, in the eyes of allocative theorists, once one recognizes
that tort law is not really a wrongs-based law of redress but instead
allocates the tangible manifestations of victims' misfortune, the problem of tort law's indifference to compliance luck dissolves. If in fact
losses they cause rather than rectifying their wrongs); HONORE, supra note 86, at 85-86
(noting that tort law, as compared to criminal law, often attaches liability to conduct that is
minimally faulty and that this feature is consistent with tort law's effort to allocate responsibility for harms in a fair manner); RIPSTEIN, supra note 85, at 85 (arguing that Vaughan's
use of an objective standard demonstrates that tort law seeks to set fair terms of social
interaction rather than to attach liability to morally wrongful conduct on the grounds that
it is wrongful).
88
Again, we emphasize that these theorists, in contrast to Posner and Calabresi, do
not depict tort law as a collection ofjudicially-imposed liability rules that function-or can
be made to function-as instruments for promoting a goal such as causing actors to take
efficient precautions against harming others. Still, they insist that tort is not a law of
wrongs, but instead a law that gives expression to principles of fair loss-allocation. And for
them, fairness is determined not by principles of distributive justice or need but by a conception of when one person may justifiably be deemed responsible for another's loss.
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torts like negligence and trespass are not primarily concerned with
setting norms of how to behave toward others, then one need not
worry that tort law may deem actors to have done "wrong" even
though, because of compliance luck, their conduct was faultless inthe
sense of not involving conscious or advertent wrongdoing.8, When an
opinion in a tort case speaks about the defendant's conduct in terms
of breach of duty, injury, and the like, and that language is taken at
face value, notions of blame and morality are in play. And those
whose conduct is so described might wonder if they are getting the
worst of both worlds-the judgmentalism and opprobrium that goes
with notions of wrongdoing-without the nuanced and more luck-resistant categories associated with Kantian approaches to morality. By
contrast, an approach that asks, "Who can justifiably be asked to bear
this loss?" is not concerned with who committed a wrong, but rather
who can, on grounds of efficiency or fairness, be ordered to pay. The
notion of wrongful conduct fades to the background and, with it, the
problem of compliance luck.9 °1
B.

What Compliance Luck Teaches Us About Torts

In Part II.A we suggested that the problem of compliance luck
provides the launching pad for theories of tort law that seek to drive a
wedge between torts and wrongs. These theories, by recasting tort as
allocating victim misfortune according to notions of fairness or efficiency, stand apart from genuinely wrongs-based conceptions of tort.
The most prominent current proponent of a robust wrongs-based tort
theory is Ernest Weinrib. 9 1 In his view, a tortfeasor incurs a moral
duty of repair just because he has wronged the plaintiff.9

2

The legal

system recognizes this moral duty by defining certain wrongs and imposing a legal duty of repair on persons who commit them. For
Weinrib, the requirement to compensate the loss is an artifact of a
89
Of course, this phenomenon might be problematic for some other reason; it might
be inefficient, unfair, or otherwise undesirable from a policy perspective to reallocate
losses to the Menloves of the world because they cannot take steps to prevent those losses.
But this is now a different sort of concern. The problem lies not in a deep conflict between
morality and tolerance of luck, but instead in debatable empirical or normative propositions about when and why losses should be reallocated.
9o Coleman's theory of corrective justice purports to offer an account of torts as
.wrongs," but he is careful to indicate that he uses the term "wrongs" only in an extended
sense. He also emphasizes that the hallmark of tort law is the assignment of losses to
tortfeasors. See COLEMAN, supra note 85, at 324-35. As suggested below, we share Coleman's sense that the wrongs of tort law are distinct in some ways from full-blooded moral
wrongs. We do not agree, however, that this entails that tort law can only be understood as
instantiating a just scheme for allocating losses.
91
SeeWEINRIB, supra note 31, at 134-36, 142-44.
92 See id. at 135 ("With the materialization of wrongful injury, the only way the defendant can discharge his or her obligation respecting the plaintiff's right is to undo the
effects of the breach of duty.").
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more fundamental requirement-the moral requirement of undoing
or rectifying a wrong that one has done to another. 93 To explain tort
liability as based on a determination of who should bear the costs of
which injury is to put the cart before the horse. 94 The tortfeasor must
bear the costs of the victim's injury, according to Weinrib, only because requiring him to do so is the appropriate response of the legal
95
system to the tortfeasor's having wronged the victim.

Although we reject important aspects of Weinrib's approach-including his commitment to formalism, 9 6 his belief that Aristotlean corrective justice, when combined with a Kantian notion of agency,
captures the sense in which tort is a law of wrongs, 9 7 and his notion
that tort law instantiates a moral duty of repair 9 8-we share his view
that wrongs are basic to tort, rather than an offshoot of principles of
fair or efficient loss allocation. 99 In short, as noted above, we believe
that tort liability is predicated on the commission of a wrong-a failure to act in accordance with a relational norm of right conduct-that
in turn generates in a victim of the wrong a power to respond to the
wrongdoer. We therefore cannot explain away the problem of compliance luck by means of the strategy we have attributed to allocative
theorists. Instead, as this subpart will argue, a wrongs-based view such
as ours can incorporate and will be clarified and improved for having
incorporated an account of how one can, at least in some cases, act
wrongfully even though one lacks the ability to have acted
otherwise.10 0
Worries about compliance luck form only one of several overlapping objections to wrongs-based conceptions of tort. Specifically, we
have in mind three major interpretive difficulties that scholars have
identified as afflicting views of torts as genuine wrongs. We label these
the "Moralist's Problem," the "Positivist's Problem," and the "Doc93 See id. at 135, 143.
94 See id. at 143 ("Because the actor's breach of duty infringes the sufferer's right,
liability reflects the defendant's commission of an injustice. Liability is therefore not the
retrospective pricing or licensing or taxing of a permissible act.").
95
See id.
96
See id. at 22-55.
97
See id. at 56-83.
98 See id. at 122 ("[Hlaving a right implies that other actors are under the moral necessity to refrain from infringing it.").
99 Unlike Weinib, we do not maintain that tort law's wrongs are pre-political in any
strong sense.
100
Here we will be pursuing a path marked by Coleman, among others, who distinguishes between acts characterized by "fault in the doer" and "fault in the doing." COLEMAN, supra note 85, at 333. The latter are acts that can plausibly be described as wrongful
even though not connected to any moral defect in the wrongdoer. Id. Our analysis attempts to capture more explicitly why a thinner, less character- and control-dependent
conception of wrongdoing is plausible generally and why tort law is a particularly apt locus
for the use of such a conception.
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trinalist's Problem." Each raises the following distinct objection to
wrongs-based understandings of tort.
The Moralist's Problem. The alleged wrongs of tort law are not necessarily moral wrongs and are frequently not even close enough to
t°
what is meant by "wrongful" to merit the appellation "wrong."1 '
Torts are wrongs only in the sense of having been labeled as such;
moral wrongfulness is neither necessary nor sufficient for liability.
In other words, the idea of "wrong" figures in tort only in a question-begging manner.
The Positivist's Problem. Tort law is constituted by rules that specify
when liability is or is not to be imposed. It is true that the imposition of liability is often connected to judgments of how people
should or should not behave, and that tort law often tries to provide
incentives for not committing such conduct or to constrain the imposition of liability based on whether the defendant was engaging in
such conduct. But insofar as the law itself exists as an autonomous
set of rules, these are not rules of right conduct-of how one really
ought to behave. Instead, they merely specify when conduct will
have the particular consequence of subjecting the actor to a governmentally imposed fee in the form of liability for damages.
The Doctrinalist's Problem. Even if some areas of tort law involve
wrongs-based liability, many areas-namely, those that are governed
by the principle of strict liability-clearly do not. These include not
only torts pertaining to property rights, ultra-hazardous activities,
and product sales, but also rules of vicarious liability and workers
compensation schemes. A purportedly descriptive theory of tort
that excludes all of these is untenable; hence tort law cannot accurately be described as a law of wrongs.
Our major concern in this subpart is the Moralist's Problem, but it will
be helpful to address briefly the other two.
Although we address the Positivist's Problem in greater detail
elsewhere, 10 2 we can summarize our basic point as follows: one can
insist that law is largely distinct from morality without thinking that
the difference consists of a division between a realm of genuine duties
(morality) and a realm of liability rules that merely resemble genuine
duties but are not (law). Rather, one can distinguish between moral
and legal duties by reference to the sources, structure, and content of
each type of duty. In this view, tort law is best understood as generating obligations (i.e., setting rules and standards of how one must be101 For example, as noted above, trespass can be committed even where the trespasser
is acting reasonably or in a manner that is innocent. See supra note 78-79 and accompanying text. Likewise, a person doing his or her best can still commit actionable negligence.
See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
102 SeeJohn C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Seeing Tort Law from the Internal
Point of View: Holmes and Hart on Legal Duties, 75 FORD.AM L. REV. 1563, 1586-90 (2006)
(addressing the Positivist's Problem by building on H.L.A. Hart's response to Holmes and
John Austin).
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have toward others) that are legal (i.e., formulated and enforced by
judges in the process of deciding cases) rather than moral. Admittedly, this sort of Hartian conception of what makes obligations legal
is easiest to grasp when dealing with rules of conduct stated clearly in
statutes. But it is not the case-as Hart himself insisted 03-that legal
rules need be legislative in origin to be legal. There is plenty of evidence, both in torts and elsewhere, that rules of right conduct often
are judge-made or judge-articulated. Indeed, the various judiciallyfashioned tort causes of action state on their faces that persons must
refrain from acting, or are required to act, in certain ways toward
others. In light of these rules of conduct, legal duties exist to treat or
not treat others in those ways. The wrongs of tort law are violations of
these duties.
The Doctrinalist's Problem has been overstated by a few decades'
worth of academic work built on a theoretically-driven attraction to
strict liability. 104 Our view-and the view of tort law both traditionally
and still in most courts-is that it is often a mistake to equate "liability
without fault" with "strict liability." For example, vicarious liability is
not strict tort liability. Indeed, it is not a rule of tort liability at all.
Rather, it is a doctrine of agency law that is concerned with when an
agent's wrongful conduct toward a third party can be attributed to the
principal on whose behalf the agent was acting.' 05 In addition, many
torts are articulated in terms of elements and defenses that do not
prompt an inquiry into whether the alleged tortfeasor was at fault. Yet
such torts also do not impose strict liability in the sense of liability
without regard to whether any wrong has been done. As we have
seen, trespass does not require proof that the person who has invaded
another's property has acted unreasonably or even unjustifiably. 10 6
But it is still a wrong to commit trespass in that one has run afoul of
the legal directive that one must not violate another's property rights
by intentionally occupying or invading property owned by another. 0 7
The failure to comply with this directive is the legal wrong of trespass.
This observation does not necessarily end the argument, for there remains the question of whether the combination of intent and "strict
See id. at 1588.
See Goldberg, supra note 31, at 537-38 (discussing efforts by enterprise liability theorists to cast tort history and doctrine as broadly supportive of strict liability).
105
Which is presumably why the doctrine was and still is restated in the Restatement of
Agency rather than the Restatement of Torts. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.04
(2006).
106
See supra text accompanying notes 78-79.
107
One can commit trespass unknowingly by intentionally occupying land that one
has no reason to know is owned by another. But one cannot commit trespass accidentally,
in the sense of acting without any intent to occupy the land in question-for example,
carelessly losing control of one's car so that it ends up, against one's will, on property
owned by another.
103
104
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liability" that figures in trespass is robust enough to make it meaningful rather than circular to talk about it being a "wrong." However, this
merely leads us back to the Moralist's Problem. The point is not that
the Doctrinalist's Problem is defeated but that, in this context, it does
not constitute a separate line of argument. 108
So let us return to the Moralist's Problem, focusing on negligence. As we noted above in connection with Vaughan and other examples, 0 9 the objectivity of the standard of care in negligence law
naturally leads to the concern that legal negligence is not a wrong in
any meaningful sense because it is indefensible to treat someone who
does his best to be careful as having acted in a wrongful manner. And
here is where luck figures into tort law in a very significant manner: it
is bad (constitutive) luck to be born awkward or imprudent. But as
both Vaughan, Holmes, and the overwhelming majority of courts and
tort scholars have agreed, tort law determines whether there has been
careless conduct and whether there shall be liability without considering this luck. It is just the defendant's bad legal luck.
One can extract from this and other examples of objective negligence two reasons that seem to undercut any claim that negligence
law is wrongs-based. First, conduct clearly can be the basis for negligence liability even though it does not manifest bad character. The
reliable physician and waiter we imagined above might well be stellar,
upright members of the community who just happen to make mistakes. Second, negligence liability can attach whether or not the putative wrongdoer had the ability to adjust his or her conduct to comply
with the norm of taking reasonable care not to injure others. The
wrongdoer may not merely have tried to do his or her best but may
have actually done his or her best to be careful. There are both direct
and indirect routes by which to use these two reasons as arguments
that negligence law is not wrongs-based. The direct route would claim
lo
To say that the Doctrinalist's Problem issignificantly overstated isnot to say that it
has no purchase. In fact, by pressing it, its advocates have perhaps helped to isolate pockets of truly strict, non-wrongs-based liability that stand in contrast to the general character
of tort as a law of wrongs. For example, liability for blasting or other abnormally dangerous activities may not be genuinely wrongs-based. At a minimum, one likely can find language in judicial decisions applying this doctrine that emphasize that the law in no way
disapproves of the activity in which the defendant engaged and that there is no legal directive or injunction to refrain from the conduct in question. Liability, on this rationale,
attaches despite the fact that the conduct is not enjoined by the law as wrongful.
Although those who pose the Doctrinalist's Problem are prone to expand out from
special cases of socially valuable but highly dangerous activities such as blasting so as to
treat more mainstream doctrines-particularly the law of products liability-as likewise not
wrongs-based, we think this is a mistake, although the issue is difficult and may depend on
the category of products liability claim. For now we can say that, in many cases at least, the
products liability cause of action does treat as a wrong the act of injuring someone by
placing a dangerously defective product on the market for use by consumers.
109
See supra text accompanying notes 66-83.
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that a necessary component of the concept of a wrong is that the action manifests (or normally manifests) a shortcoming of moral character or that the action is one that a person could, by exercising
conscious choice rightfully, have avoided. The indirect route would
claim that both of these are fundamental features of the concept of a
moral wrong and that if putative legal wrongs deviate too far from
moral wrongs in their nature, then they are not recognizably instantiations of the notion of a wrong.
We do not want to address either of these arguments head on, at
least for the time being. Rather, we want first to identify reasons why
it might be plausible to see legal negligence as a form of wrongdoing.
That is, we want to consider how much of a notion of wrongdoing is
left when we are dealing with a standard or norm of conduct that does
not assess behavior in terms of or with sensitivity to incompetencies or
other comparable causes of noncompliance.
The first feature of negligence law that connects it to the idea of
wrongs is that it consists in large part of norms enjoining people not
to act (or to act) in certain ways with respect to certain interests of
others. For example, negligence law enjoins drivers to drive with ordinary prudence so as to avoid causing bodily injury (or apprehension
of imminent bodily injury) to others including drivers, cyclists, pedestrians, and outdoor caf6 patrons. That tort rules articulate norms of
appropriate conduct, as opposed to setting prices or providing liability
rules, is evidenced by various features of our language and practices.
Most mundanely, it is perfectly commonplace to describe the act of
driving around a corner too hastily as "wrong," regardless of whether
the driver is Menlovian. Moreover, such conduct is of the sort that
people are taught that they ought not to do and that most drivers will
concede falls below relevant standards of good driving. Feelings of
guilt, shame, or regret often accompany such conduct even if it does
not injure another, but especially if it does. However demanding,
norms requiring objective reasonable care as to others differ from
rules that impose genuinely strict liability (i.e., for reasons not having
to do with an assessment of the tortfeasor's conduct as in some sense
falling short or being inadequate). Negligence law sets standards of
how to do right by others, violations of which are quite intelligibly
understood as wrongs.
Second, victims of these norm violations are likely to regard
themselves as having been wronged and tend to have concomitant
feelings of resentment and blame in response. 110 The point here is
110
See P. F. Strawson, Freedom and Resentment, 48 Proceedings of the Aristotelean Society (1962) (generating a well-known theory of responsibility that builds, in part, on the
observation that the human response of resentment to those who injure us is
fundamental).
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not that victims will expect or demand compensation; rather, it is that
they will probably feel ill-treated, a response that may be classified as
one of having been wronged. In other words, there is a category of
tort-victim responses that resembles responses to clear cases of having
been morally wronged."' In these cases, the nature of the feeling is
not simply affective and noncognitive; it is a feeling of having been
victimized that goes along with recognition of a norm enjoining people from behaving toward others in the way in which the tortfeasor
behaved toward the victim. This is the non-question-begging sense in
which these sorts of responses constitute a feeling of having been
wronged.
Third, and connecting the first two points, various systems and
practices of education and norm reinforcement exist that involve
identifying norms of careful conduct, identifying transactions in
which the norm has been violated with respect to some person, and
then permitting, sanctioning, or facilitating a response by the victim
that involves isolating the norm-violator and subjecting such person to
adverse treatment. Most parents, teachers, and other authority figures
strive to instill in others a sense of obligation to adjust one's actions in
light of potential consequences for others. ("Be careful." "Don't run
indoors." "Watch what you're doing." "Watch out for others." "Don't
do it that way or you'might hurt somebody." "Driving is not a game.")
Departures from norms of careful conduct are often met with opprobrium, blame, and possibly punishment. These practices in turn lend
legitimacy to victims' sense that they are not merely unlucky to have
suffered an injury, but have grounds for complaining about it when it
arises because another person has acted carelessly toward them. Picture another driver hitting your car by heedlessly drifting into your
lane. You might think to yourself, 'Just my luck!" Still, it is unlikely
you would mean this in the same sense as if you uttered it after a
hailstorm damaged your unoccupied, parked car. Rather, you would
likely mean something like, 'Just my luck to have been driving next to
an idiot!"-a way of speaking that (effortlessly) assigns responsibility
and blame while acknowledging the role of luck. Negligence law
grows out of and connects with everyday events such as these. It enables a plaintiff to recover damages from another if she succeeds in
persuading a court that the defendant acted wrongfully toward her so
as to injure her. The state will in this sense enable the plaintiff to hold
the defendant responsible for having wronged her.
Fourth, the language of wrongs fits quite naturally with negligence law's core idea that one has a duty-is literally obligated-to
refrain from acting toward others in certain ways, and correlatively,
IllI

One example is the case of a gratuitous, intentional physical attack.
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with the idea that others have the right not to be acted upon in such
ways. Individuals rely daily on others heeding their duties, on having
others respect their rights, and on a legal entitlement to respond if
others wrongfully violate those rights. Although each of us drives
knowing that others will occasionally drive badly (as will we), we also
12
drive expecting that most drivers will drive responsibly and carefully. 1
Moreover, many victims of careless conduct would probably be surprised and frustrated if, for example, the legal system forbade them
from responding to their wrongdoer in some way. Victims expect, either as a matter of self-help or the law, that they can respond to their
wrongdoers if they so wish.
Finally, the issue of whether an individual has wronged another
generates a series of questions regarding how the wrongdoer should
be treated. At a minimum, tortious behavior such as negligence
stands to harm the wrongdoer's reputation. This consequence goes
hand in hand with the opprobrium that accompanies the determination that a person has acted negligently toward another. The upstanding and highly skilled physician may rightly retain his overall standing
in the relevant social circles. Yet his commission of negligence against
another will count as a black mark on an otherwise stellar record.
In all of these respects, acting without reasonable care so as to
injure another constitutes a way of mistreating others. And this form
of mistreatment shares a great deal with the notion of a moral wrong,
even though linkages to character and control are severed. These five
features are quite enough to earn legal negligence, and torts more
generally, the status of wrongs. As we noted above, 1 13 several philosophical theorists of tort law-Honor6 and Perry, to be sure, and perhaps Coleman-insist that tort law has a moral foundation primarily
because tort liability is predicated upon responsibility for outcomes
and that this sort of responsibility is a moral notion. Still, these thinkers have displayed far less confidence-and at times have even rejected-the notion that the concept of wrong (or wrongdoing), as it is
used in tort, is a moral notion. Even Gardner, who has expressly defended the idea that duties requiring success, rather than duties requiring best efforts, are genuine duties and that such duties are
embedded in tort law, ultimately seems to agree with Honor6 on the
sense in which tort law can be understood as instantiating legal counterparts to moral duties. For it is Honor6's account of outcome-responsibility to which Gardner turns for the source of his response to

112 The same goes for patients seeking treatment from doctors and purchasers buying
consumer products from retailers and manufacturers.
113
See supra text accompanying notes 86-90.
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what he terms the "moral intelligibility objection" to a wrongs-based
14
description of tort law.'
The conjunction in torts of wrong-like features with the missing
character-and-control components, once appreciated, is neither awkward nor mysterious. Our society teaches and institutionalizes norms
of responsible conduct. When people violate these norms in a way
that injures others, victims are resentful and respond to their wrongdoers. Society is prepared to stand behind these victims, to issue various kinds of responses to and judgments upon the violator, to let the
violation and the injury affect the wrongdoer's reputation, and to
treat that person as a rights violator and a person who has wronged
another. And the violator faces these consequences notwithstanding
that it is often a matter of bad luck, not bad character or bad choice,
that leads to the wrong being done.
Why would the law do this? Our short answer-which borrows
but also departs from Gardner's helpful usage-is that tort law has
generally sought to set norms defined in terms of success rather than
best efforts. 1 5 This is partly due to the law's prophylactic concern to
be overinclusive. It may be that the prototypical negligence case involves wrongdoings with both bad character and failure to take care
well within the actor's control: conduct that, even if not willful, is not

1 14 John Gardner, Obligations and Outcomes in the Law of Torts, in RELATING

TO RESPONSI-

BILITY: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF TONY HONOR9 ON His 80TH BIRTHDAY 111, 135-41

(Peter
Cane &John Gardner eds., 2001) (presenting Honor's idea of outcome-responsibility as
providing the basis for a successful reply to the "moral intelligibility" objection to an account of tort law as a law of genuine duties). Coleman, Perry, and Ripstein emphasize the
idea of allocating losses to a defendant who is outcome-responsible for those losses. Their
view puts so much weight on the concept of responsibility that they cannot attribute adequate significance to the role in tort of wrongs-i.e., conduct that amounts to a wronging
of a victim by an actor. We recognize that this is a somewhat tendentious claim as to each
theorist, in light of Coleman's overt linkage of torts to "wrongs," Perry's reliance on notions of fault and duty to identify outcome-responsible agents who bear duties of repair,
and Ripstein's embrace of Weinrib's work. A similar caveat is in order with respect to
Gardner's work given his conception of tort as a realm of genuine duties. We cannot
adequately address these interpretive questions with regard to any of these four theorists in
the present Article.
115
Gardner distinguishes between duties (and reasons) to try and duties (and reasons)
to succeed. Id. at 117; Gardner, supra note 20, at 53. Where we perhaps part ways with
Gardner is over his apparent inclination to characterize the tort of negligence-or more
precisely, the duty and breach elements of negligence-as instantiating a duty to try, rather
than a duty to succeed. See Gardner, supra note 114, at 120 (arguing that, although the tort
of negligence embodies a duty to avoid injuring, as opposed to a duty to avoid unduly
risking injury, that duty is qualified in requiring only that the duty holder "tly assiduously
enough to avert.., the unwelcome side-effects of one's... endeavours" (emphasis added)).
Although we too have argued that the tort of negligence articulates a qualified duty to
avoid injuring another, we think that the qualification is properly cast in terms of a success
concept rather than an efforts concept-i.e., as a duty to avert injury to another by successfully exercising the care required of an actor under the circumstances.
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innocent in the way that Menlove claimed his to be innocent. 1 6 Suppose that the target wrongdoings of negligence law-those that negligence law unambivalently aims to identify as wrongful and for which it
intends to permit redress-are character- and control-linked. Questions would still arise as to how these norms should be defined, what
the means of identifying their violations are, when the law should allow redress, and what the parties should have to prove. The judges in
Vaughan thought that enforcing norms of conduct would be impractical and difficult if they defined right conduct by reference to both
individual characteristics and good faith.' 17 Indeed, they were worried' 1 8 that the adoption of a best efforts standard would invite argu19
ments regarding the limited abilities of each tort defendant.'
Although the foregoing point is typically couched in terms of evidence and administrability, 120 our argument goes beyond recognizing
that judges and legislators should avoid resting legal determinations
on questions that are difficult to adjudicate. Rather, part of what is
behind negligence law's reliance on a relatively broad conception of
fault-failure to act reasonably, not failure to make best efforts to act
reasonably-is a sense that such a conception provides the most appropriate substance for these sorts of norms, as opposed to being a
second-best accommodation of administrative difficulties. A system of
norms that uses success verbs to define required conduct and failure
verbs to define impermissible conduct sends a stronger message about
how society expects its members to behave. From an educational perspective, it is probably desirable to articulate norms in terms of what
citizens are ordinarily able to do rather than what a given individual
can do. 12 1 In terms of fairness to potential defendants, the distribution or characteristics of accident-proneness in the population surely
116 Indeed, notwithstanding this argument-and notwithstanding Vaughan's serving as
the poster child for the objective standard of care-there is good reason to believe that this
is exactly the scenario in Vaughan. Menlove was advised repeatedly that it was dangerous to
stack hay in the manner in which he did. Vaughan v. Menlove, (1837) 132 Eng. Rep. 490,
491 (C.P.). Instead of heeding that advice, Menlove responded that his hay was insured
and that he was therefore willing to "chance" having the hay catch fire. Id.
117 See id. at 493 (Tindal, C.J.) ("Instead ... of saying that the liability for negligence
should be co-extensive with the judgment of each individual, which would be as variable as
the length of the foot of each individual, we ought rather to adhere to the rule which
requires in all cases a regard to caution such as a man of ordinary prudence would
observe.").
118 This worry may have been justifieci given the suggestion that Menlove was fully
aware of the risk in question. See id. at 491.
119 The concern here is akin to the concern that if the diminished mental capacity
defense were expanded, criminal defendants would routinely invoke it.
120 See Vaughan, 132 Eng. Rep. at 493 (Tindal, C.J.).
121 A point made by the wise Yoda, responding to his pupil Luke Skywalker's hedge
that he would "try" to master the ways of the Force. Says Yoda to Skywalker: "Do, or do not.
There is no try." STAR WARS EPISODE V: THE EMPIRE STRIKES BACK (Twentieth Century Fox

1980). Thanks to Bob Rasmussen for this reference.
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matters. Suppose that what distinguishes some or many of Holmes's
"hasty and awkward" persons 122 from more capable persons is not that
they are incapable of prudence, but that they are prone to act imprudently at a somewhat higher rate than the general population. Under
this supposition, the law would be on strong ground in requiring the
unlucky Menloves to do what they are most often able to do.'123 Finally, norms articulated in terms of success rather than effort may better define or capture the content of certain individual rights. For
example, battery law renders actionable intentional touchings of
others that are not physically harmful but violate social norms of acceptable touching even if the person doing the touching is unaware of
those norms. 2 4 Battery law does this because such a rule fully expresses the idea that people have the right to control when they are
purposefully or knowingly touched by another.
Of course, the law could take this type of reasoning further and
exchange norms such as "do not injure others through imprudent
conduct" for the more demanding strict liability norm of "do not injure others." Arguably, this strict liability norm is more readily taught
and more easily administrable than the objective reasonableness norm
or the norm against inappropriate intentional touching. It also better
matches victims' perceptions of the rights they possess and their entitlement to feel resentment whenever they are injured by another.
And perhaps there is some historical precedent for it.

25

supra note 4, at 108.
See Stephen R. Perry, Responsibilityfor Outcomes, Risk and the Law of Torts, in PHILOSOPHY AND THE LAW OF TORTS 72, 101-08 (GeraldJ. Postema ed., 2001) (discussing the general capacity to foresee and avoid injuries). By contrast, the argument against having tort
law hold mentally incapacitated persons-e.g., a person suffering from severe mental retardation-responsible for wrongs strikes us as more c-mpelling. Black-letter rules make no
room for an insanity defense to tort claims, or at least to negligence claims. See, e.g., White
v. Muniz, 999 P.2d 814, 818 (Colo. 2000) (holding that a battery cannot be committed by a
person who, because of mental incapacity, lacks the awareness necessary to form an intent
to cause harm or offense to another, but such a person can be held liable for negligently
injuring another). It may matter that this rule will more likely apply to seriously mentally
disabled persons in assessing their comparative fault for their own injuries. Even as applied to tort defendants, the doctrine may not be best explained as holding incapacitated
persons responsible for having wronged others but instead as a means of reallocating losses
as between actors and innocent victims or of holding persons with custodial responsibilities
vicariously liable. See, e.g., Breunig v. Am. Family Ins. Co., 173 N.W.2d 619, 624 (Wis. 1970)
(articulating these rationales).
124
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 18 (1965) (offensive contact). Depending
on the rule of a given jurisdiction, offensive-contact battery may require only that the defendant intentionally touch the plaintiff in a way that society deems unacceptable. So, for
example, a newly arrived immigrant who strokes a stranger's hair and is unaware that doing so is an unacceptable form of touching might be liable for battery.
125
The old writ of trespass required victims merely to allege bodily injury directly
caused by the forcible act of another. However, juries were permitted to consider extenuating circumstances, including absence of fault (however defined) in rendering their verdicts. J.H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 403-05 (4th ed. 2002).
122
123

HOLMES,
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The answer to why the law might nonetheless sensibly fashion
norms of care rather thannorms of not injuring is three-fold. First,
the state must determine the appropriate extent of legal redress. The
further norms of conduct move away from defining wrongs that implicate character and factors over which an actor has control, the more
anxious we will-and should-feel about a system that purports to assign liability on the ground of genuine wrongdoing deserving of opprobrium, sanction, etc. Even if tort law could be built around a
collection of strict liability norms or a single strict liability norm, it
might then be so disconnected from other categories of right-conduct
norms as to be what Posner and others claim (erroneously) that it
already is-a law of wrongs in name only and hence one that risks
26
illegitimacy. 1
Second, strict liability norms threaten greater infringement on
liberty.' 27 To embrace unqualified standards of noninjury as genuine
norms of conduct is to place on actors a very demanding set of responsibilities. Even if the substitution of a strict liability norm for a
care-based norm might not incentivize a certain kind of rational actor
to be more careful, 128 it may incentivize the actor to partake in the
activity less frequently or to forego it entirely. 29 The same effects
would be more dramatic on citizens who view legal obligations as carrying a kind of weight or force and who aim to conform their conduct
to those obligations. A care-based system thus allows for more liberty
of action than one with stricter norms.
Third and most importantly, law that sets norms of conduct that
are too demanding undermines the cogency of treating them as something with which one should aspire to comply. The claim of a norm to
be a norm of right conduct, and hence wrong-defining, is diminished
if compliance with the norm is completely outside the control notjust
of the occasional Menlove (or a person having a Menlovian episode),
but of anyone. If the law articulates norms purely in success terms,
such norms cease to function as guides or standards of conduct with
which everyone of a certain description must comply.
For all of these reasons, negligence law has settled on an intermediate path. Its norms of conduct are defined in terms of success, but
in a qualified form. The qualifications permit the norms to be something for which actors can aim and usually satisfy. In doing so, these
qualifications circumscribe the nature of victim's correlatively recogSee supra note 5 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., HOLMES, supra note 4.
128
See, e.g., STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAw 24 (1987) ("Under
both strict liability and the negligence rule injurers are led to take socially optimal levels of
care, but under the negligence rule they engage in their activity to too great an extent
because, unlike under strict liability, they do not pay for the accident losses they cause.").
129
See id. at 24-25.
126
127
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nized rights and diminish the availability of redress for injured victims.
As such, this conception of wrong is objective, meaning that legal negligence is character- and control-independent and that the question of
whether an actor has committed negligence is subject to luck. Negligence law's remedies and its wrongs-based language and imagery will
sometimes apply to an "innocent" defendant. This is his or her bad
legal luck. In many instances, drivers, doctors, manufacturers, retailers, publishers, accountants, underwriters, employers, teachers, and
camp counselors, among others, are held liable in tort for substantial
amounts, causing them pain and shame, because, notwithstanding
good faith, their conduct crossed a line set by the law. In some instances, these cases leave defendants disillusioned by our system in
part because it has treated them as wrongdoers when, with some justification, they do not consider themselves wrongdoers in a fullblooded, culpable sense.
We have sought thus far to explain why the categories of wrong in
tort law can be, at least in some standard instances, objective and qualified.' 3 0 We have based our account on normative and practical considerations concerning certain kinds of primary legal rules. But there
is another set of reasons that relates more specifically to the nature of
tort law as a law of redress. As we noted at the outset, tort liability is
imposed in response to the commission of a wrong. 131 We have argued, contrary to allocative theorists, that the notion of wrongdoing
here is not a gap-filler but is genuinely a species of the same genus as
moral wrong. 132 However, we do not deny that the use to which the
idea of a wrong is put in tort law affects its institutional and political
characteristics. The wrongs of tort law are articulated in the particular
context of deciding whether a plaintiff shall be permitted to exact
compensation or some other remedy from the defendant. It is, in
short, a finding that an act has been done that authorizes redress of a
13 3
wrong, a right of action.

Just as there is a question of how tort rules of conduct should
look if they really are going to function as norms of conduct or guidance rules, there is also a question of what acts should permit aggrieved persons to prevail in lawsuits conceived of as redress for a
wrong done to them. Recall the examples above of the surgery slip,
the driver's skid, and the drug company's failure to warn. 1 34 The reasons for deeming these to be wrongs does not simply relate to the
administrative ease, educative value, or rights-reinforcing characteris-

132

See supra notes 67-83 and accompanying text.
See supra text accompanying notes 1-3.
See supra notes 109-29 and accompanying text.

133

See

134

See supra text accompanying notes 74-76.

130

131

GOLDBERG ET AL.,

supra note 1, at 3; Goldberg, supra note 31, at 517.
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tics of rules that define as wrongful certain conduct that does not reflect bad character and that is not fully within a given actor's ability to
avoid. In all of these cases, victims appropriately and reasonably feel
mistreated and not just because they are part of a society with a legal
system that dubs these acts as wrongs. All of the victims have been
injured in a way that warrants their thinking that someone else is responsible for mistreating them and that their wrongdoer is an appropriate person from whom to demand redress or satisfaction. A patient
can plausibly say to her otherwise very accomplished and successful
doctor: "I'm sure you are a great doctor and a decent, well-meaning
person. And I believe that this slip-up was an aberration. But the fact
remains that you did slip up and that you did so with me on the operating table. Whether or not this is an isolated departure from the way
you usually do things doesn't diminish the sense in which you are responsible for doing what you did to me. You injured me and you did
so by failing to act as you were supposed to act." It is likewise quite
possible that the imagined defendant would feel responsible and regretful and would regard herself as at least somewhat culpable in a
moral sense and owing some sort of amends to the victim, if only an
apology. Insofar as the state provides rights of action in place of other
forms of redress-in particular, vigilantism-it makes sense for the
dimension of the wrong to be broader than rigid character-and-control conditions would admit.
Criminal law, at least on one conception, provides a useful foil in
this respect. The "wrongs" that generate criminal liability are of a different sort than the "wrongs" of tort. In criminal law, the state is not
empowering private parties to redress wrongs done to them. Instead,
the state itself is punishing an individual because of his wrong. 1 35 For
this reason, the wrong in question does not need to be a wrong to
anyone. These features may help explain why, generally speaking, we
ask criminal law to define its wrongs with greater clarity and apply
standards of conduct that are linked more tightly to character-andcontrol criteria.
Consider the example of a patient who is undergoing a relatively
straightforward operation to repair a hernia. Through the fault of an
anesthesiologist who provides too much anesthetic by a factor of ten,
the patient is rendered a paraplegic. Now suppose that the doctor in
question is a well-trained, highly competent professional who has
practiced for twenty years without mistake, that she is perfectly wellrested on the day in question, and that there is nothing in the preparations or procedures she followed that day indicative (in a non-question-begging sense) of a failure to act conscientiously in terms of
135

See

HOLMES,

supra note 4, at 42.
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being attentive to the well-being of the patient. Still, her preparation,
procedures, and vigilance do not prevent her from erring in the manner described. It seems unlikely, on these facts, that there would be a
basis for criminal prosecution. 13 6 The state's interest in this matter, as
opposed to the victim's, does not warrant the administering of punishment or the incapacitation of the doctor.
On the other hand, tort liability is quite likely. Our system would
treat the plaintiff as entitled to redress for the wrong done to hershe was negligently rendered paraplegic. Again, this legal result reflects various considerations. Among them is the notion that, when
the question involves an injurer's responsibility to a victim, there is
more room to identify conduct as wrongful. That the defendant perpetrated a wrong may have been, in some senses, a matter of bad luck.
But because this bad luck occurs in a context in which the law attributes a special kind of responsibility as between wrongdoer and victim,
bad luck is not treated as a ground for denying responsibility. The
larger point is that the concept of wrong at issue is sufficiently objective that we can plausibly view our system as functioning in just the
manner it is supposed to operate. This view holds even when judges
and jurors conclude that tortious conduct has occurred though the
defendants would justifiably-and perhaps correctly-regard themselves as having acted in a manner that, from a moral point of view
emphasizing character and control, was not wrongful.
We have argued above that in very significant respects the wrongs
of tort law are recognizably wrongs, sharing much in form and character with moral wrongs. And, of course, they share a great deal in content, too. To the extent that tort wrongs are of the same species as
moral wrongs and even though tort law accepts the role of luck as we
have articulated it, tort law is a normative practice that accepts moral
luck not simply in consequence, but in its very definition of what
counts as a wrong. And we have argued that there are good reasons
for selecting such a normative system, notwithstanding that it may
sometimes be difficult to accept the consequences of doing so.

136 This contention depends on how best to characterize criminal law. We assume for
the sake of argument that criminal law seeks to punish and deter wrongs that rise to a
certain level of gravity or particularly concern the state given its interest in maintaining
public safety. If it is instead conceived of more on a regulatory model, in which the aim is
to steer conduct through sanctions and threat of sanctions regardless of whether the conduct in question is a serious wrong or a wrong at all, then prosecutions for minimally faulty
(or even non-faulty) conduct might be warranted.
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IV
IMPLICATIONS

The problem of compliance luck does not prevent us from viewing the law of torts as a law of wrongs. Likewise, tort law's tolerance of
causal luck does not leave it vulnerable to charges of injustice. 13 7 To
establish these claims is by no means to show that, all things considered, tort law is always preferable to schemes that are less luck-dependent for their operation, such as victim-compensation funds fueled by
tax revenues or fines.138 Nonetheless, it does shed important light on
this sort of issue.
First, we now have grounds to reject arguments that leading
scholars have characterized as dispositive critiques of tort law or as
grounds for completely reconceptualizing it. According to causal luck
critics like Larry Alexander, Christopher Schroeder, and Jeremy Waldron, tort law should be supplanted by alternative schemes at the first
possible opportunity. 1 39 But neither logic nor justice in fact counsels
that "[w]e should abolish the tort system."' 40 Likewise, Posner and
many who have followed in his methodological footsteps argue that
the unintelligibility of tort as a law of wrongs necessitates a fanciful
reconstruction of tort law as an instrument for achieving efficient deterrence. 14 1 We have shown that there is no such necessity, which in
turn provides one less reason for scholars to jump on that particular
methodological bandwagon.
Moreover, by rebutting these arguments, we have not merely established that tort law is coherent in the minimal sense of being intelligible. Rather, we have shown that the idea of responsibility within
tort law meshes well with familiar and powerful everyday judgments
about responsibility that are deeply embedded in social practices.
Tort, in other words, is entirely recognizable. Thus, if one conceives
of politicaljustification in terms of attaining a Rawlsian reflective equilibrium between abstract principle and ordinary intuition, it seems
very plausible to suppose that tort law's mode of holding actors responsible is a justifiable feature of our political and legal system.

137 See supra Part II.
138 Cf Avraham & Kohler-Hausmann, supra note 25, at 181 (arguing that, even if justice-based accounts of tort law are internally coherent, they fail to justify having a body of
laws devoted to the instantiation of tort justice because there are other schemes that could
be used to respond to accidents that are less influenced by luck).
139
See generally Alexander, supra note 25 (posing the question of whether tort law
.makes sense" and concluding that it does not).
140
Id. at 23.
141
See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
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Second, our responsive arguments support a conception of tort
law that is descriptively superior to alternative accounts. 42 As we suggested at the outset of this piece and at various times since, the same
wrongs-and-redress view that underlies our rebuttal of the causal luck
critics and our response to allocative theories of tort also provides the
interpretive advantage of taking the vocabulary and syntax of tort law
at face value rather than second-guessing it.1 43 Likewise, this view best
explains otherwise puzzling features of that law, including the requirement that a tort plaintiff establish that the defendant committed a
wrong as to her and the availability, under some circumstances, of punitive damages, understood as a special form of redress available for a
special class of wrongs. 144 It also captures better than competing theories the centrality of private rights of action to tort law. 145 And this
account may fit best with ordinary citizens' views of what the tort sys1 46
tem in principle aims to do.

142
See also Benjamin C. Zipursky, Civil Recourse, Not CorrectiveJustice, 91 GEO. L.J. 695
(2003) (arguing for the descriptive superiority of wrongs-and-recourse theory over both
corrective justice theories and law-and-economics theories of tort).
143
See supra text accompanying notes 1-3.
144
See supra text accompanying notes 34-49, 65.
145
See supra text accompanying note 34. The nearest competition for interpretive "fit"
are the allocative views of certain corrective justice theorists, described briefly above. But
even these views face significant challenges. As we have seen, they are predicated on the
idea that tort law starts with the loss that the unfortunate plaintiff suffered and asks when it
is appropriate to shift that loss to someone else. Doctrinally, this seems far too narrow a
view to capture the domain of tort. Tort law is about redressing injury, which may or may
not be accompanied by losses. See GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 1, at 3; Zipursky, supra note
142. While negligence law requires proof of tangible losses for the plaintiff to have a cause
of action, it is unusual in this respect. Battery, assault, trespass, fraud, libel, and many
other torts do not require proof of harm or loss in any non-question-begging sense. Instead, they require injury-an interference with an interest of the plaintiff's (e.g., an interest in undisturbed property ownership or bodily control) that may or may not give rise to
tangible losses. See supra text accompanying notes 73-79. For example, if D as a practical
joke surreptitiously sedates P, such that the only effect on P is that P experiences a deep
sleep for ten hours, P may still, in principle, sue D for battery. Any recovery would constitute redress for the invasion of P's dignitary interest in not being deliberately made to
ingest a substance she did not choose to ingest.
In addition, tort law quite evidently has a guidance function; it does not simply allocate losses after the fact. A lawyer advises her magazine-publisher client on what she can
say without committing the tort of libel or invasion of privacy; a lawyer advises his psychiatrist client whether certain people need to be warned of a victim's dangerousness; a lawyer
advises her pharmaceutical company client what harms physicians and patients must be
warned of and instructed about. Tort law sets norms of right conduct. This, as we noted
above, is why it is cogent to regard torts--treating someone in a manner tort law calls
tortious-as legal wrongs.
146
As indicated above, loss-shifting views, whether economic or fairness-based, attempt
to divorce the wrongs of tort law from ordinary notions of moral wrongs to solve or minimize the problem of compliance luck. See supra text accompanying notes 67-89. However,
if our supposition is correct-that the prevalent social understanding of tort law is as a law
of wrongs and redress-then there is a possibility that loss-shifting views will in the end not
dampen but intensify concerns over tort law's substantive rules from conventional moral
norms. A push to justify liability on the ground that it promotes efficient precaution-taking
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Third, the wrongs-and-redress conception of tort law we have invoked and developed here contains a normative dimension in that it
captures how tort meshes with other aspects of our legal and political
system in achieving certain goods or instantiating certain values. Jurists and theorists ranging from Locke to Austin have offered considered views about why a government founded on democratic and
liberal principles will have reason to provide its citizens with law that
empowers victims of wrongs perpetrated by others to respond to them
without resort to self-help. 14 7 Indeed, Blackstone as well as American
jurists of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries spoke comfortably
of citizens possessing a right to a law of redress and of governments
148
being under an affirmative duty to provide such law.
Of course, since the mid-twentieth century, law professors have
generally been suspicious of common law and the common law of
torts in particular. 1 49 However, at least when presented as wholesale
critiques, these positions are misguided or overblown.15 0 Consider
the sentiment, prevalent since Holmes's time, that people living in
modern or post-modern times have "outgrown" the need for legal redress. 15 1 No doubt it is a mark of civilized government that it generally outlaws simple vengeance and private retaliation. But it is far less
clear that a government that fails to empower victims with legal recourse can claim to be more modem or more civilized as opposed to
being less attentive to citizens' legitimate demands. As the victims'
rights movement in American criminal law may suggest, citizens can
be legitimately frustrated with a government that essentially says:
"We're sorry for your loss. If you need money or other assistance, you
can apply for benefits. Otherwise, go away and let us deal with the
one who did this to you."
or achieves a fair allocation of losses may well be perceived not as succeeding in removing
the wrongs from tort but rather as rendering tort doctrines unjust and inexplicable deviations from the core idea of wrongs that underwrites the enterprise of tort law in the first
place. We suspect that this unhappy constellation of trends may be one of the reasons the
tort reform movement is so able to capture the public imagination, in spite of what we
regard as its largely ill-advised proposals.
147
Goldberg, supra note 2, at 532-44 (Locke and the common lawyers); Goldberg,
supra note 62, at 462-64 (Austin).
148 Goldberg, supra note 2, at 549-76.
149 See Goldberg, supra note 31, at 520-21;John C.P. Goldberg, Essay, Unloved: Tort in
the Modern Legal Academy, 55 VAND. L. REv. 1501, 1506-07 (2002).
150 See, e.g., Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 37, at 1799-1811 (suggesting that modern
efforts to read the duty element out of negligence mistakenly treat particular applications
of that concept as if they demonstrate the inherent incoherence and regressivity of the
concept itself); Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 31, at 384-408 (criticizing as simplistic
"Great Society" critiques of the common law of tort).
151
HoLMES, supra note 4, at 10, 46, 130-31, 149, 161-62 (suggesting a movement in
the common law generally from primitive notions of vengeance to modern notions of prevention and compensation).
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As a law of wrongs and redress, tort law meshes well with, and can
help realize, other core values. In holding all persons-rich and
poor, powerful and powerless-to the same duties and by empowering each to seek redress when duties are breached and injuries result,
tort law embodies and enforces notions of social equality. 152 It literally empowers citizens, entitling them to make demands that a court
must hear rather than treating them as recipients of government beneficence.1 5 3 Additionally, tort law fashions a set of obligations that
help maintain civil society as a non-atomistic, not purely contractual
social world.1 54 At the same time, tort law-which tends to hold strangers only to negative duties of non-injury-expresses "liberal" values
by not being overly demanding.15 5 Tort also "speaks" to citizens
through guidance rules that tend to track familiar norms of behavior
rather than imposing an alien code of conduct.1 5 6 As such, it is not
forced to rely as heavily on threat and sanction for its efficacy, nor
does it require a large bureaucracy for its implementation. 1- 7
In observing what tort law, as a law of wrongs and redress, stands
to deliver, the foregoing analysis makes a fourth contribution by helping to clarify the ways in which tort and non-tort regimes interact.
Although we have disputed the need to resort to "allocative" or lossshifting theories to make sense of tort and the ability of these theories
to provide satisfactory interpretations of tort doctrine and practice, we
do not mean to dispute the obvious appeal, in many circumstances, of
the idea of loss shifting as a response to victim misfortune. Because of
the acts of others, victims sometimes suffer major setbacks and incur
significant costs that they have not brought upon themselves. Given
that these losses are bad luck for the victim, it is natural and often
justifiable to decry as harsh or unfair a legal system that is content to
let these sorts of losses lie where they fall.
Still, to observe that victim misfortune is a ground for demanding
a response from the legal system is not to say what form that response
should take, nor is it to say that any body of law concerned with victim
152
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See Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 31, at 406-07.
Id. at 406.
See id. at 405-07.
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See id.

153

156 See id. at 404.
157 We should make clear that we are not denying the existence of pathologies associated with a law of wrongs and redress, including, for example, excessive litigiousness and
indefensible attributions of responsibility and liability which sometimes result when attorneys exploit or over-stimulate the moral sensibilities of both jurors and judges. In fact, our
account of tort law as setting norms of proper conduct that are in some ways relatively
unforgiving might help on this last score. One of our central aims is to dissociate the idea
of committing a wrong from the idea of engaging in highly culpable, easily avoidable conduct. lfjudges andjurors can appreciate that torts often do not carry the full weight associated with other forms of wrongdoing, perhaps they will also see that victims of such wrongs
are entitled to less substantial redress than is owed to victims of out-and-out moral wrongs.

1168

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 92:1123

misfortune is thereby built on loss-shifting principles. In fact, during
the period from roughly 1880 to 1980, judges and legislators often
addressed the problem of undeserved losses by expanding the reach
of tort law. In particular, judges extended the domain of legal negligence.15 8 In pursuing this course, the courts did not thereby give up
on the idea of tort as a law of wrongs and redress, supplanting it with a
law of fairness-based loss shifting, much less efficiency-based loss shifting. Instead, they treated victims' demands for compensation as an
occasion to reconsider the contours of negligence-i.e., of who might
fairly complain of having been wronged by the carelessness of
another.

159

That courts have historically taken instances of victim misfortune
as an occasion to rethink when certain actors are answerable for
wrongs to others demonstrates that the pressure to respond to undeserved losses is often tied up with notjust the fact of loss, but the sense
that certain people are being victimized. When this is the case, tort
law-a body of law known for its responsiveness to changing norms of
conduct and changing conceptions of cognizable harm-is available
to fill the legal void. In this way, tort law occupies space that might
otherwise be occupied by loss-shifting regimes and eliminates some or
all of the need for reliance on such regimes. Of course, government
is not limited to responding to losses through a law of wrongs. Indeed, if it is faced with losses that are not plausibly traceable to others'
wrongs (e.g., certain losses stemming from natural disasters) or if the
losses in question cannot for some other reason be adequately dealt
with by a law of wrongs, government will instead want to implement
systems built on principles of fair loss shifting or, for that matter, principles of distributive rather than corrective justice. In the area of
workplace injuries, workers' compensation systems have arguably substituted a law of loss shifting for a law of wrongs. Likewise, federal
legislation built on notions of loss shifting or redistribution have provided some measure of relief to victims of black lung disease, vaccine-

158
See Gary T. Schwartz, The Beginning and the Possible End of the Rise of Modern American
Tort Law, 26 GA. L. REV. 601, 605-17 (1992).
159
We take this to be the very significance of watershed modern negligence cases like
MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916). See Goldberg & Zipursky, supra
note 37, at 1812-25. Obviously, there is considerable debate over how to understand the
emergence of strict products liability in the 1960s and 1970s. Some will argue that the
doctrine provides an example of courts responding to victim misfortune by identifying a
new wrong. Others will contend that the doctrine implements non-wrongs-based loss-shifting principles. Our view is that at least some-and perhaps many or most-instances of
products liability rest on the notion that product sellers commit a wrong against consumers
by releasing a product with a defect posing dangers of physical injury during ordinary use,
which danger is later realized.
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related illnesses, and those who lost loved ones on 9/11.161 Although
these examples may establish that there are kinds of undeserved loss
that are better handled by laws not built on tort principles, they in no
way suggest that laws designed to shift losses or redistribute wealth
somehow carry priority over law that renders wrongdoers answerable
to their victims. At most, they demonstrate only that different laws
respond to losses in different ways, based on different rationales, and
that lawmakers must attempt to determine when it is appropriate to
rely on one or another type of law or create hybrids that attempt a
compromise among different rationales and results.
Courts and scholars have rightly been impressed by the demonstrated capacity of tort law, in the hands of twentieth-century judges
and juries, to address the needs of a larger number of accident victims
and to set norms of right conduct for a larger number of actors whose
conduct risks harm to others. In the process, many have noticed the
actual and potential ability of tort actions such as negligence and strict
products liability to achieve important governmental goals in an age
of accidents, most obviously compensation of victims and regulation
of risk. Ironically, the elasticity of tort law in serving these practical
ends has sometimes misled these same courts and scholars to infer
that tort law has no substance other than its capacity to serve these
ends-that tort law just is a scheme for compensating victims and deterring risk-producers. In several prior articles, we have argued-in
the same vein as corrective justice theorists such as Jules Coleman and
Ernest Weinrib-that there is no basis for such an inference and that
a purely functional or instrumentalist view of tort has no hope of interpretive adequacy. 16 1 In this Article, we wish to draw out one further point, which is particularly relevant to the topic of luck and tort
law.
Although the luck problems we have focused on pertain to treatment of risk generators (defendants and would-be defendants), some
critics of tort have focused on the role of luck with respect to injured
parties (plaintiffs and would-be plaintiffs). They argue that tort law is
unjust because innocent accident victims stand to receive compensation only if another's faulty conduct has caused the accident. If no
one else was at fault, victims receive nothing even though every (innocent) victim's injury is equally a misfortune. The differential treatment of "equally deserving" accident victims is a feature of tort law
162
that, according to these critics, renders it unfair.
Alan Erbsen, From "Predominance"to "Resolvability " A New Approach to Regulating Class
160
Actions, 58 VAND. L. REV. 995, 1086 n.204 (2005) (referencing these programs).
See, e.g., Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 31; Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 37;
161
Zipursky, supra note 37.
Avraham & Kohler-Hausmann, supra note 25, at 182.
See, e.g.,
162
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We assume that this plaintiff-side fairness critique is meant to
convey something more than the commonplace and unhelpful observation that life is "unfair" in how it "selects" individuals for good or
bad fortune. Rather, the idea must be that there is an unfairness in
our legal system for which the state is responsible, such that to point out
the unfairness is to provide a reason to revise our legal and political
system. This idea can be broken down into two components: (1) that
our tort law is unfair because, for no sufficient reason, it excludes some

accident victims from recovering their losses but not others, and (2)
that the -set of systems that, in one way or another, address accident losses (of
which tort law is a part) is unfair for permitting some but not others to
be compensated.
As noted above, 16 3 nothing that we have said in this Article speaks
to whether the state should deploy institutions other than tort law to
compensate innocent victims- of non-fault-based accidents to the same
degree as the victims of fault-based accidents. There may well be
needs-based and distributive-justice based arguments in favor of doing
so. However, for reasons that we have pointed out elsewhere, none of
these arguments is quite as obvious as one might have thought. One
need only look at the next plausible question-why should accident
victims be treated any better than disease victims?-to see that this is
not a straightforward or simple question. 164 One also has to take into
account nongovernmental devices, such as first-party insurance, that
can provide a relatively efficient way to compensate victims, in turn
raising the question of how extensive the state's involvement in victim
compensation needs to be. 165 All of these possibilities for supplementing our legal system merit further consideration both because
many accidents have no tortious source and because tort law is frequently slow, costly, under-remunerative, inaccurate, and otherwise
unreliable even for victims of wrongfully-caused accidents. But this
sort of inquiry is precisely an inquiry into what would constitute a desirable mix of governmental and private institutions to deal with accidents and losses. Our claim is that there is plenty of reason to
suppose that tort law belongs in that mix even though, as a law of
wrongs and redress, it is law that conditions the compensation of innocent victims of accidents on a wrong having been done.
It is one thing to recognize fairness- or need-based arguments for
supplementing tort law with other avenues of compensation for accident victims. It is quite another to claim that a system of tort law like
See supra text accompanying note 138.
See Ripstein & Zipursky, supra note 27, at 230-31 (arguing that, once freed of the
notion that liability is what a wrongful injurer can be held responsible for, legal systems
have no reason to select accident victims over other innocent but unfortunately needy
people as the beneficiaries of largesse).
165
See Baker, supra note 26.
163

164
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our own, in which some accident victims are adequately compensated
and some are not, is unfair in its own right. This critique presupposes
that all accident losses are properly construed as free-floating costs
and that tort law is therefore a means by which the state chooses how
to allocate those costs among the population. With this view in place,
tort law's willingness to let innocent accident victims' misfortunes lie
where they fall in some cases but not others generates an unfair and
indefensible scheme of allocation.
We reject the entire picture of tort law that this critique presupposes. Through tort law, courts recognize claims that an actor has
committed a legal wrong against a victim, thereby empowering the
victim to obtain redress from the wrongdoer. An accident victim who
has no plausible claim to having been legally wronged-even under a
broad conception of legal wronging-has no tort claim. From the
perspective of tort law, harm suffered by an accident victim is just
that-the victim's harm-not some free-floating bundle of costs. To
be sure, there is the question of whether money can be obtained that
would mitigate the suffering incurred, but within tort, this is always a
question of whether there is someone else from whom the accident victim should be able to recover money. Since the basis of a defendant's
vulnerability to an action for damages in tort is the defendant's having
wronged the plaintiff, there is no basis for reallocating losses where
there is no wrong, and the injured plaintiff's claim to compensation
must fail.
It will not suffice now for the victim-luck critic to say that we are
begging the question on what a "wrong" is, or that we are being formalistic. A major point of this Article has been to explain what is special about the wrongs with which tort is concerned and how tort
deploys "wrongs" in a way that is flexible and capacious without being
vacuous. We have also emphasized why it might matter-in terms of
the way our legal system works and in terms of our political system's
values-whether we do or do not retain a law of tort. Finally, we have
noted that, even if one accepts our arguments, many questions remain
regarding whether non-tort mechanisms for accident compensation
should be harnessed as a supplement or partial substitute for tort.
And yet we have argued against the notion that these supplements or
substitutes, simply by virtue of being more luck-resistant, enjoy some
sort of obvious normative superiority to tort. There is nothing question-begging or formalistic about any of these arguments.
Finally, and with some trepidation, we suggest that our analysis of
the significance of moral luck for tort law has potentially interesting
implications for the treatment of moral luck in its original locus-
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moral philosophy. 1 66 Perhaps the most obvious lesson is that ideas
like wrongdoing and responsibility are not unitary but instead form a
cluster of related ideas with different shadings and implications in varied settings. As writers in both the natural law and legal positivist
traditions have pointed out, there are important respects in which custom, law, religion, and morality form distinct domains notwithstanding their overlap. Thus, although each is a source of rules and
standards of appropriate conduct, the character and content of these
norms as well as the consequences of breaching them vary in important ways.
Moreover, as we have shown, even within the domain of law, one
can and must distinguish between different modes of attributing responsibility. As Anglo-American lawyers well understood 200 years
ago, there is a fundamental difference between the state engaging in
criminal punishment of a wrongdoer on behalf of society and the state
empowering a private party to exact some sort of remedy from one
who has wronged her. Luck plays distinct roles within these different
domains. In tort, whether a wrong amounts to the wrongful injuring
of another is the whole ballgame. The law seeks to determine
whether there is a victim who is entitled to seek redress and to whom
the wrongdoer must answer. If this can be the case for a body of law,
it seems reasonable to suppose that there are parallel modes of holding actors responsible in the moral realm. Whether in law or morality,
the matter of one's responsibility for another's injury because of misconduct is distinct from the matter of one's culpability or blameworthiness for that conduct. Morality, like religion and custom,
presumably distinguishes among relational wrongs, abstract wrongs,
injuries, losses, repairs, and so on. To understand the role of luck in
morality with more nuance, one should proceed from thinking about
these different levels of responsiveness in moral categories, not just
legal categories.
Second, we noted that courts have typically insisted on defining
the wrongs of tort law objectively. Their reasons for doing so relate to
a range of considerations, many of which pertain to educability, ruleof-law values, the capacity to institutionalize various standards of conduct and to administer them. Yet it is not only law that must answer to
at least some of these systemic values. A variety of informal standardsetting normative practices must do so as well. In short, moral conceptions of wrong often need to be defined in an accessible and nonparticularistic way. There is a trade-off between the capacity of a sys166
See generally Benjamin C. Zipursky, Two Dimensions of Responsibility in Crime, Tort, and
Moral Luck, 9 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. (forthcoming Jan. 2008) (developing aspects of
the causal luck analysis offered above to elucidate moral luck problems within moral
philosophy).
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tern to define wrongs in a manner better immunized against fortune
and its capacity to satisfy these other desiderata-a trade-off that will
apply in morality, not just law. The problem of moral luck is not simply a paradox or an intellectual conundrum. It is not just inevitable,
given the way things are. It exists as the flip-side of various desirable
attributes of normative systems.
Of course, it remains to be seen whether there are other normative systems that we can rely upon less for the enjoyment of system
values and more for the relative immunity from luck. Assuming, with
Williams, that the concept of morality cuts across all the ways we think
about standards of conduct and that we assess and respond to conduct
with those standards in mind, there is no possibility of transcending
the domain of luck though there might be particular, narrower domains in which there is greater immunity from the ravages of fortune.
Still, it would be a mistake to suppose that these domains are somehow fundamental. Rather, they exist only as part of a more robustly
defined and sustainable set of practices-both legal and non-legal-of
holding individuals responsible. If this is so, then what Williams referred to as the Kantian conception of morality is less important than
it purports to be not only because it is unable to transcend luck 67 but
also because the image of moral assessment as a luck-free zone can be
seen to be in some sense artificial and derivative rather than basic or
essential.
Finally, Nagel used the topic of moral luck to explore deep philosophical questions about naturalism and determinism, internal and
external perspectives on human action, and the role of will rather
than nature in bringing things about. 168 Nagel suggested that over
time, we come to see others' conduct as regular and predictable and
therefore as natural or "caused" phenomena. Yet, he claimed, we at
the same time read will, intent, and choice into others' conduct because we regard our own actions as free in this manner. In other
words, we are able to experience others' conduct as morally blameworthy or praiseworthy, in part because we are able to regard our own
in this manner. 169
An obvious variant on Nagel's idea-one frequently made in the
analogous context of skepticism-is to flip around the self/other
point within moral psychology. Perhaps our highly nuanced reflective
emotions and self-assessments should be understood, in part, as growing out of external practices of assessment, holding responsible, and

blame. To be sure, we learn to empathize with others and to imagine
what they feel by thinking about how we feel or would feel. But part
167
168

169

See Williams, supra note 8, at 39.
See Nagel, supra note 8, at 36-38.
See id. at 37-38.
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of socialization in general and moral education in particular involves
learning how others regard the way we have treated them. 70 One
need not go to a full-blown Freudian theory of parent as superego to
accept the observation that holding oneself accountable is in some
sense a matter of learning to regard oneself as others do.
All of these observations add up to a more general strategy for
thinking about the rich and puzzling domain of moral intuitions with
which Williams and Nagel flooded readers in their celebrated essays
on moral luck. We have argued that tort law consists of a highly structured, institutionalized mcans of empowering victims to redress the
wrongs done to them by others. For many unsurprising and sound
reasons, whether such avenues of redress against others are available
literally depends on fortune. What we see in tort law we also see in
the more informal normative practices of morality and custom. For
example, a school teacher will hold a child responsible for knocking
over her classmate and will instruct her to help the child up and apologize. And now we can go one step further: a child learns to feel
responsible for the injury she has inflicted upon another. Whether a
hard shove on the staircase results in a scare or a tumble down the
stairs makes a big difference not just in tort but in other social practices in which one is held responsible for injuring another. It should
not be at all puzzling that our internal self-assessments are in similar
ways luck-dependent. This is not just a matter of armchair moral psychology. It is so because the concepts of responsibility and wrong that
we apply to ourselves are concepts that belong, in significant part, to a
realm of institutionalized practice in which they play important systemic roles. There may well be good philosophical reasons to try to
isolate the more institutionally dependent from the less institutionally
dependent aspects of these concepts. Perhaps the aspiration to define
a realm of morality that is luck-free is connected with this separation
effort as well. But it would be dogmatic to suppose that these less
socially and institutionally dependent aspects, if there are any, are logically, morally, or historically prior to the more dependent.
CONCLUSION

We have made several claims in this Article. First, we argued that
the most frequently mentioned luck-related reason for criticizing tort
law is unsound. Tort law's differential treatment of actors engaged in
See JOHN DEWEY, HUMAN NATURE AND CONDUCT 315 (1922) ("Liability is the begin170
ning of responsibility. We are held accountable by others for the consequences of our acts.
...
In vain do we claim that these are not ours; that they are products of ignorance not
design, or are incidents in the execution of a most laudable scheme. Their authorship is
imputed to us. We are disapproved, and disapproval is not an inner state of mind but a
most definite act.").
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identical wrongdoing, based on whether that conduct causes injury, is
entirely defensible. To see this, one need only recognize the difference between private rights of action and liability, on the one hand,
and government prosecutions and punishment on the other.
Second and conversely, we argued that there is a more serious
luck-related concern about tort law, which we labeled the problem of
compliance luck. Whether a defendant has committed a tort is often
unconnected with his character and his control because many torts,
most importantly negligence, take an objective stance on wrongfulness. Although this feature of tort law has led many theorists to deny
that it is a system for redressing wrongs, we argued that this conclusion is unwarranted. Once one understands that tort rules are guidance rules and that these rules form part of a framework that aims to
define wrongs for the purpose of empowering victims of wrongs to
obtain redress from wrongdoers, the character-and-control independence of wrongs are defensible fe,tures of that law.
Third, we have argued that appreciating tort's distinctive characteristics as a law of wrongs offers various advantages. Among other
things, it permits a better grasp of legal doctrine, a more nuanced
appreciation of what values tort law serves within our legal system, and
a more acute sense of tort law's limits, its connection to other forms of
law, and the tradeoffs between tort and non-tort regimes. We have
also suggested that defusing the problems of moral luck in tort law
sheds light in the parallel domain of moral philosophy.
Although this is, broadly speaking, a "law and philosophy" article,
its aim has not been to offer a reinterpretation of an area of law by
reference to a prefabricated philosophical framework. Indeed, our
claim is that tort scholarship has been bedeviled by critical doubts
only because of the force that scholars have attributed to the abstract
philosophical proposition that, if an actor is genuinely to be held accountable for a wrong, his act's being a wrong cannot depend on
mere luck. Our goal has been to ward off the criticisms and doubts
driven by this philosophical proposition so that we might gain a better
understanding and appreciation of the actual practices of tort as a law
of wrongs and redress.
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